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THE PRICING OF CONTINGENT CLAIMS AND OPTIMAL POSITIONS IN
ASYMPTOTICALLY COMPLETE MARKETS
MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS, SCOTT ROBERTSON, AND KONSTANTINOS SPILIOPOULOS
ABSTRACT. We study utility indifference prices and optimal purchasing quantities for a contingent claim,
in an incomplete semi-martingale market, in the presence of vanishing hedging errors and/or risk aversion.
Assuming that the average indifference price converges to a well defined limit, we prove that optimally taken
positions become large in absolute value at a specific rate. We draw motivation from and make connections
to Large Deviations theory, and in particular, the celebrated Gärtner-Ellis theorem. We analyze a series of
well studied examples where this limiting behavior occurs, such as fixed markets with vanishing risk aversion,
the basis risk model with high correlation, models of large markets with vanishing trading restrictions and the
Black-Scholes-Merton model with either vanishing default probabilities or vanishing transaction costs. Lastly,
we show that the large claim regime could naturally arise in partial equilibrium models.
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between utility indifference prices and optimal positions
for a contingent claim, in a general incomplete semi-martingale market, under the assumption of vanishing
hedging errors. In particular, for an exponential utility investor, we wish to verify the heuristic adage that
when purchasing optimal quantities one obtains the delicate relationship
position size × risk aversion × incompleteness parameter ≈ constant.
Here, the incompleteness parameter represents the hedging error associated with the claim. From the
above we see that as the market becomes complete (or, at least as the given claim in question becomes
asymptotically hedgeable), optimal position sizes tend to become large. In fact, optimal position sizes may
also become large as risk aversion vanishes in a fixed market, and our analysis is robust enough to cover
both cases.
The financial motivation for studying this situation is that large positions are indeed being taken. For
example, the over the counter derivatives markets now has more than 700 trillion notional outstanding (see
[7]). Other examples include mortgage backed securities, life insurance contracts and mortality derivatives.
These products are not completely replicable and a position on them implies unhedgeable risk. Therefore,
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it is natural to study the situation within the framework of utility based analysis in incomplete markets.
Moreover, the observation that position size is connected to hedging error can be understood as follows.
In a complete market there is only one fair price d for a given claim. Hence, if one is able to purchase
claims for price p 6= d then it is optimal to take an infinite position. Of course, in reality one cannot take
an infinite position and complete markets are an ideal situation. However, these considerations indicate that
large positions may arise endogenously, if the hedging error or risk aversion is small. We also mention
that this is the underlying motivation for the indifference price approximations in the basis risk models of
[12, 21], which we revisit in the current paper.
Starting at least from [22], utility indifference pricing has attracted a lot of attention, see for example
[9] for detailed overview. Recently, indifference pricing for large position sizes has been studied in [8,
33, 34]. In [34] the authors consider a sequence of a particular semi-complete market indexed by n that
becomes complete as n → ∞ and, assuming the unhedgeable component of the non-traded asset vanishes
in accordance to a Large Deviation Principle (LDP), it is shown that optimal purchase quantities become
large at precisely the Large Deviations scaling.
To help motivate our results, let us briefly outline the main idea. Let n ∈ N and consider a semi-
martingale market with available risky assets for investment Sn, and an investor who owns a non-traded
contingent claim B. The investor has exponential utility with risk aversion an > 0, where, in addition to
the assets, we allow the risk aversion to change with n so that Uan(x) = −(1/an)e−anx, x ∈ R. Let An
be the set of admissible trading strategies and Xπn = (πn · Sn) be the resultant wealth process, for some
πn ∈ An. The optimal utility that the investor can achieve by trading in Sn with initial capital x and q units
of B is
unan(x, q) = sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uan(x+X
πn
T + qB)
]
; unan(x) = u
n
an(x, 0).
Then, the average bid utility indifference price pnan(x, q) is defined through the balance equation
unan(x− qpnan(x, q), q) = unan(x).
It is well known that pnan does not depend upon x, and writing pnan(q), takes the form
pnan(q) = −
1
anq
log
(
EQ
n
0
[
e−anqYˆ
n
an
(q)
])
,
where Qn0 is the minimal entropy measure in the nth market and Yˆ nan(q) is related to the normalized residual
risk (see [1, 31] amongst others) of owning q units of B. Thus, pnan can be viewed as a “generalized” version
of the scaled cummulant generating function Λn(q)/q, where Λn(q) := log
(
E
[
eqYn
])
for a sequence of
random variables {Yn} from Large Deviations theory (see [15] for a classical manuscript). Taking a cue
from the celebrated Gärtner-Ellis theorem, which deduces an LDP for the tail probabilities of {Yn} from the
assumption that λ 7→ (1/rn)Λn(λrn) converges to a sufficiently regular function as rn →∞, we naturally
ask what conclusions can be deduced from the assumption that ℓ 7→ pnan(ℓrn) converges to a well defined
limit for ℓ ∈ R and rn →∞. Specifically, we assume (see Assumption 3.3) that there exist a sequence {rn}
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of positive numbers with rn →∞ and a δ > 0 such that for all |ℓ| < δ the limit
(1.1) p∞(ℓ) = lim
n↑∞
pnan(ℓrn),
exists, is finite, and is continuous at ℓ = 0. The price p∞(0) is thus the limiting price ignoring position size,
and when the market is asymptotically complete, represents the unique arbitrage free price in the limiting
complete market: see Section 4.3.
As a first consequence, we prove (see Theorems 4.3, 4.4) that large optimal positions arise endogenously
at a rate proportional to rn. Specifically, for any price p˜n which is arbitrage free in the pre-limiting markets,
the optimal position size (as defined in [24]) qˆn = qˆn(p˜n) is such that for n large enough
|qˆn| ≈ ℓrn, for some ℓ ∈ (0,∞),
provided that p˜n → p˜ 6= p∞(0). Namely, we have |qˆn| → ∞ at the speed of rn.
Secondly, in Section 5 we show under which conditions the large claim regime could arise in an equi-
librium setting, with a particular focus on justifying the assumption that, asymptotically, one could buy the
claim for a price p˜ 6= p∞(0). Provided that stock market prices are exogenously given, the equilibrium price
of a claim is the one at which the optimal quantities of the investors sum up to zero, meaning that the market
of the claim is cleared out. If such a (partial) equilibrium price exists for each n ∈ N, it is natural to ask
where this sequence converges to, and if the prices induce investors to enter the large claim regime. Here,
we show that if the investors’ random endowments are dominated by rn, then equilibrium prices converge
to p∞(0); the unique limiting arbitrage free price. However, if investors’ endowments are growing with rate
rn, equilibrium prices may converge to a limit p˜ 6= p∞(0) and hence the large claim regime of Theorems
4.3, 4.4 occurs. This happens when one investor already owns large position in B, and yields a family of
examples where the large claim regime is in fact the market’s equilibrium. This result helps to explain the
large observed volumes in OTC derivative markets and the corresponding extreme prices that often appear
(see for instance [2, 7]).
Thirdly, we illustrate through numerous and varied examples that the price convergence in (1.1) holds,
and hence is a natural feature of either asymptotically complete markets or vanishing investor’s risk aversion
in a fixed market. Moreover, in all of these examples we explicitly identify the speed rn at which optimal
positions grow. To be precise, we validate these claims in the following cases: (a) vanishing risk aversion
in a fixed market in Section 6.1, (b) basis risk model with high correlation in Section 6.2, (c) large markets
with vanishing trading restrictions in Section 6.3, (d) Black-Scholes-Merton model with vanishing default
probability in Section 6.4, and (e) vanishing transaction costs in the Black-Scholes-Merton model in Section
7.
The vanishing transaction costs example of Section 7 probably deserves more discussion. The first in-
teresting point is that our theory unifies frictionless markets and markets with frictions, such as transaction
costs. In particular, not only do the statements on optimal positions in frictionless markets carry over, but
in both cases, the main results turn out to be natural outcomes of the same general statements presented in
Appendix A. The second interesting point is that our analysis reveals that the natural relation between risk
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aversion, an, optimal position size, qˆn, and proportion of the transaction costs, λn is anqˆnλ2n ≈ constant.
Apart from the conclusion that for fixed risk aversion, this relation indicates that rn = λ−2n , i.e. that
qˆnλ
2
n → ℓ ∈ (0,∞), it also justifies the appropriateness of the limiting asymptotic regimes, which were
considered previously without justification; for example, as in [4, 23].
Even though our focus in this paper is on investors with exponential utility, our results are also true
within the class of utility functions that decay exponentially for large negative wealths, see Section 4.5. In
this case, the optimal position is not necessarily unique. However, we prove that optimizers do exist and
that under the assumption of convergence of indifference prices with speed rn, for exponential utility, each
optimizer will converge to ±∞ with speed rn.
We conclude the introduction with a discussion on the applicability and usefulness of the results of this
paper. First of all, our analysis offers a bridge between complete and incomplete markets. Complete mar-
kets, where computations are often tractable and explicit, are clearly an idealization of reality. However,
their more realistic incomplete counterparts are typically intractable when it comes to identifying optimal
trading strategies and pricing contingent claims. To connect these two settings, it is thus natural to con-
sider small perturbations away from complete markets. In the case of fixed investor preferences, this paper
addresses precisely this situation, and we show that as the perturbation vanishes, large investors may en-
dogenously arise through optimal trading. Secondly, our work also acts as a bridge between risk averse
and risk neutral investors. For example, it is often assumed that market makers are risk neutral, which is of
course only approximately true. Our analysis shows, however, that as market makers approach risk neutral-
ity, they will be induced into both taking large positions and offering prices so that other buyers enter into
the market in a large way. Thirdly, the equilibrium results of Section 5 show that it takes only one person to
be in the large claim regime in order for others to enter that regime by acting optimally. Hence, our results
can be also used to both study and justify the emergence of large players in derivative markets, in the setting
where players take large positions immediately, as opposed to incrementally increasing their position sizes.
Fourthly, our work can help towards correctly pricing claims in the presence of small unheadgable risks
(e.g. in the insurance industry), when positions are of significant size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in detail the model and the optimal
investment problem. In Section 3 we lay down our main assumption on convergence of scaled indifference
prices and draw motivations with and connections to Large Deviations theory. In Section 4 we describe
the main consequences of the assumption of convergence of scaled indifference prices. Namely, we state
the theorems on optimal positions and discuss their consequences. We additionally discuss the limiting
behavior for the optimal wealth process, and justify the interpretation that the speed rn characterizes the
speed at which the market approaches completion. Moreover, we prove that the general results on optimal
positions are true for all utility functions in the class of utility functions that decay exponentially for large
negative wealths. Section 5 contains the results on the partial equilibrium model and on its limiting behavior.
Section 6 contains the motivating examples of frictionless markets that satisfy our assumptions. Section 7
contains the example with vanishing transaction costs. Appendices A, B, and C contain most of the proofs.
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2. THE MODEL, OPTIMAL INVESTMENT PROBLEM AND INDIFFERENCE PRICE
We fix a horizon T > 0, probability space (Ω,F ,P) and filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T , which is assumed
to satisfy the usual conditions. Additionally, we assume F = FT and zero interest rates so the risk-free
asset is identically equal to 1. For n ∈ N we denote by Sn an Rdn-valued, locally bounded semi-martingale
which represents the risky assets available for investment. In the sequel, we consider the valuation and the
optimal position taking in a contingent claim B ∈ L0 (Ω,F ,P) assumed to satisfy:
Assumption 2.1. E
[
eλB
]
<∞ for all λ ∈ R.
Since the assets are changing with n, the class of equivalent local martingale measures are changing
with n as well. We denote by Mn the family of measures Qn ∼ P on F such that Sn is a Qn local
martingale. Recall for two probability measures µ ≪ ν the relative entropy of µ with respect to ν is
given by H (µ | ν) = Eν [(dµ/dν) log(dµ/dν)]. In order to rule out arbitrage in each market, we make the
following standard assumption as seen in [14, 18] amongst many others:
Assumption 2.2. For each n, M˜n := {Qn ∈ Mn : H (Qn | P) <∞} 6= ∅.
We consider an exponential utility investor with risk aversion an > 0, where, in addition to the assets,
we allow the risk aversion to change with n. Thus, the investor has utility function
(2.1) Uan(x) = −
1
an
e−anx; x ∈ R.
A trading strategy πn is admissible if it is predictable, Sn integrable, and if the stochastic integral Xπn :=
(πn · Sn) is a Qn supermartingale for all Qn ∈ M˜n. The set of admissible trading strategies for the nth
market is denoted An. For an initial capital x and position q ∈ R in the claim B we define
(2.2) unan(x, q) := sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uan(x+X
πn
T + qB)
]
,
as the optimal utility an investor can achieve by trading in Sn with initial capital x and q units of B. When
q = 0 so that the investor does not own the claim we denote the value function by
(2.3) unan(x) := sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uan(x+X
πn
T )
]
.
The average (bid) utility indifference price pnan(x, q) for initial capital x and q units of B is defined
through the balance equation
(2.4) unan(x− qpnan(x, q), q) = unan(x).
We now summarize a number of well known results regarding the utility maximization problem for expo-
nential utility under the current setup and assumptions. For proofs of these facts, see [14, 18, 19, 26, 30, 32].
Since unan(x, q) = e
−anxunan(0, q) we consider without loss of generality that x = 0 throughout. The
value function without B, unan(0), is attained by an admissible strategy πˆ
n
an(0). Write Xˆ
n
an(0) := X
πˆnan(0)
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as the optimal wealth process. Additionally, denote by Qn0 ∈ M˜n the minimal entropy measure, which
exists. Then Qn0 and Xˆnan(0) are related by the formula
(2.5) dQ
n
0
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
=
e−anXˆ
n
an
(0)T
E
[
e−anXˆ
n
an
(0)T
] .
In a similar fashion, the value function for q units of B, unan(0, q), is also attained for some admissible
trading strategy πˆnan(q) and we write Xˆnan(q) := X
πˆnan(q) as the resultant wealth process. The indifference
price does not depend upon the initial capital and we write pnan(q) instead of p
n
an(x, q). By its definition,
pnan(q) is given by the abstract formula
pnan(q) = −
1
anq
log
(
unan(0, q)
unan(0)
)
,(2.6)
and the total price qpnan(q) admits the variational representation
(2.7) qpnan(q) = inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
qEQ
n
[B] +
1
an
(H (Qn | P)−H (Qn0 | P))
)
.
Note that from (2.7) one can easily deduce that for q ∈ R
(2.8) pnan(q) = pn1 (anq).
Also, using (2.5) and (2.6) we obtain
pnan(q) = −
1
anq
log

E
[
e−anXˆ
n
an
(q)T−anqB
]
E
[
e−anXˆ
n
an
(0)T
]

 = − 1
anq
log
(
EQ
n
0
[
e−anqYˆ
n
an
(q)
])
,(2.9)
where
(2.10) Yˆ nan(q) :=
1
q
(
Xˆnan(q)T − Xˆnan(0)T + qB
)
.
Yˆ nan(q) is intimately related to the normalized residual risk process of [1, 31, 37] amongst others and can be
seen as the per unit unhedgeable part of the long position on q units of the claim B.
3. LIMITING PRICES AND CONNECTIONS TO LARGE DEVIATIONS THEORY
Equation (2.9) is the starting point for our analysis. To motivate the result we first make connections with
the Large Deviation Principle (LDP) and Gärtner-Ellis theorem from Large Deviations, both stated here for
the convenience of the reader, see for example [15].
Definition 3.1. Let S be a Polish space with Borel sigma-algebra B(S) and (Ω,F ,P) be a probability
space. We say that a collection of random variables {Yn}n∈N from Ω to S has a LDP with good rate
function I : S → [0,∞] and scaling rn if rn →∞ and
(1) For each s ≥ 0, the set Φ(s) = {s ∈ S : I(s) ≤ s} is a compact subset of S; in particular, I is
lower semi-continuous.
(2) For every open G ⊂ S, limn↑∞(1/rn) log (P [Yn ∈ G]) ≥ − infs∈G I(s).
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(3) For every closed F ⊂ S, limn↑∞(1/rn) log (P [Yn ∈ F ]) ≤ − infs∈F I(s).
In this paper we take S = R.
Theorem 3.2 (Gärtner-Ellis). Let {Yn}n∈N be a collection of random variables on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Let {rn}n∈N be a sequence of positive reals such that limn↑∞ rn =∞. For each n denote by Λn
the cummulant generating function for Yn
(3.1) Λn(λ) := log
(
E
[
eλYn
])
, λ ∈ R.
Assume the following regarding Λn:
(1) For all λ ∈ R the limit Λ(λ) := limn↑∞(1/rn)Λn(rnλ) exists as an extended real number.
(2) D0Λ, the interior of DΛ := {λ : Λ(λ) <∞}, is non-empty with 0 ∈ D0Λ.
(3) Λ is differentiable throughout D0Λ and steep; i.e. limλ→∂DΛ |∇Λ(λ)| =∞.
(4) Λ is lower semi-continuous.
Then, the random variables {Yn}n∈N satisfy a LDP with speed {rn}n∈N and good rate function I(y) =
supλ∈R (λy − Λ(λ)).
To connect Theorem 3.2 with the indifference price in (2.9), assume that the position size q takes the
form q = ℓrn for ℓ ∈ R, where {rn}n∈N is a sequence of positive reals with limn↑∞ rn = ∞. In this case,
using (2.9) gives
(3.2) pnan(ℓrn) = −
1
anℓrn
log
(
EQ
n
0
[
e−anℓrnYˆ
n
an
(anℓrn)
])
= − 1
anℓrn
Γn(−anℓrn),
where, similarly to Λn above, we set
(3.3) Γn(λ) := log
(
EQ
n
0
[
eλYˆ
n
an
(−λ)
])
.
We thus see that convergence of the indifference prices pnan(ℓrn) is analogous to the Gärtner-Ellis assump-
tion that the scaled cummulant generating functions (1/rn)Λn(ℓrn) converge. However, besides the depen-
dence of probability measure on n, there is a substantial difference between Γn in (3.3) and Λn in (3.1):
namely, the random variables Yˆ nan(λ) of (3.3) are changing with λ whereas the random variables Yn of
(2.10) are not. Thus, even though convergence of the scaled indifference prices implies a connection with
a LDP for the random variables Yˆ nan(λ), we do not typically expect a LDP from random variables Yˆ
n
an(λ)
unless they do not actually depend upon λ. An example where this is the case is presented in Section 6.3
below.
We now make the main assumption in an analogous form to the Gärtner-Ellis theorem.
Assumption 3.3. There exist a sequence {rn}n∈N of positive reals with limn↑∞ rn =∞ and a δ > 0 such
that for all |ℓ| < δ the limit
(3.4) p∞(ℓ) := lim
n↑∞
pnan(ℓrn),
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exists and is finite. In particular, with
(3.5) dn := pnan(0) = EQ
n
0 [B] , ∗
the limit d := p∞(0) = limn↑∞ dn exists. Furthermore, p∞(ℓ) is continuous at 0, i.e. limℓ→0 p∞(ℓ) =
d = p∞(0).
3.1. Discussion.
3.1.1. Assumption 3.3 and Vanishing Risk Aversion. The relation (2.8) allows us to vary risk aversion as
well as position size. Specifically, Assumption 3.3 takes the form that for all |ℓ| < δ:
(3.6) p∞(ℓ) = lim
n↑∞
pnan(ℓrn) = limn↑∞
pn1 (ℓanrn).
From here, it immediately follows that if the market is fixed: i.e. if pn1 (qn) = p1(qn) for all n and qn, then
if an → 0 we may set rn := a−1n → ∞ and Assumption 3.3 holds. Indeed, p1(ℓanrn) = p1(ℓ) =: p∞(ℓ)
and continuity at 0 follows from [14] which shows that limℓ→0 p∞(ℓ) = d = EQ0 [B]. This example is
briefly additionally discussed in Section 6.1 below, and Theorems 4.3, 4.3 not withstanding, our focus in
the sequel will lie primarily on the case of fixed risk aversion in a sequence of varying markets.
3.1.2. Assumption 3.3 and Vanishing Hedging Errors. Though not explicitly stated, for a fixed risk aversion
an ≡ a, Assumption 3.3 implies the hedging errors associated B are vanishing. This follows both from the
convergence of scaled indifference prices pna(ℓrn) and, crucially, from the assumption that p∞ is continuous
at 0. To see this latter point, consider again when the market is fixed so pna(qn) = pa(qn). Here, for a
bounded claim B, as shown in [14, 32], we have
lim
n↑∞
pa(ℓrn) =


inf
Q∈M˜
EQ [B] , ℓ > 0
EQ0 [B] , ℓ = 0
sup
Q∈M˜
EQ [B] , ℓ < 0.
Thus, the convergence requirement in Assumption 3.3 holds, but the resultant function p∞ is not continuous
at 0, so Assumption 3.3 cannot hold in a fixed market (or when there is a limiting market but B is not
replicable in this market).
Alternatively, consider when all of Assumption 3.3 holds. Firstly, (2.7) implies that q 7→ pnan(q) is
decreasing and q 7→ qpnan(q) is concave. Thus, ℓ 7→ ℓpnan(ℓrn) is concave as well and, for |ℓ| < δ, so
is ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ). In particular, p∞(ℓ) is continuous on (−δ, 0) and (0, δ). Thus, additionally assuming
continuity of p∞ at 0 (and hence on all of (−δ, δ)), we obtain the useful result:
(3.7) qn
rn
→ ℓ ∈ (−δ, δ) =⇒ pnan(qn)→ p∞(ℓ).
∗See [14] for a proof of this equivalence.
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Indeed, take ε > 0 so that (ℓ− ε)rn ≤ qn ≤ (ℓ+ ε)rn for all n large enough. Since pnan(q) is decreasing:
p∞(ℓ+ε) = lim
n↑∞
pnan((ℓ+ε)rn) ≤ lim infn↑∞ p
n
an(qn) ≤ lim sup
n↑∞
pnan(qn) ≤ limn↑∞ p
n
an((ℓ−ε)rn) = p∞(ℓ−ε).
Taking ε ↓ 0 gives the result. In particular, for all fixed position sizes q and risk aversions a, we have
that limn↑∞ pna(q) = d, and this essentially implies the existence of trading strategies πn ∈ An which
asymptotically hedge B. This argument is expanded upon, in the case of bounded claims and a continuous
filtration, in Section 4.3 below.
3.1.3. On the strict concavity of ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ). Even though ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ) is concave under Assumption 3.3,
as the example in Section 4.2 below shows, it need not be strictly concave. However, under the assumption
of strict concavity a number of nice consequences ensue: for example, see Corollary 4.6 and the equilibrium
results in Section 5.
4. LIMITING SCALED INDIFFERENCE PRICES AND CONSEQUENCES
We now deduce a number of consequences of Assumption 3.3, the first of which is that the regime where
the position size q = qn = ℓrn is the appropriate one as n ↑ ∞, if the considered positions are taken
optimally. Here, we follow the approach of [24, 33, 34].
4.1. Optimal Position Taking. Define
(4.1) Bn := inf
Q∈M˜n
EQ [B] , B¯n := sup
Q∈M˜n
EQ [B] .
Assume, for all n, that B cannot be replicated by trading in Sn, and denote by In the range of arbitrage free
prices for B: i.e.
(4.2) In = (Bn, B¯n).
For p˜n ∈ In the optimal position qˆn = qˆn(p˜n) is defined as the unique (see [24]) solution to the equation
(4.3) sup
q∈R
(
unan(−qp˜n, q)
)
.
As shown in [24], qˆn satisfies the first order conditions for optimality
(4.4) p˜n = EQqˆn(p˜
n)
[B] ,
where Qqˆn(p˜n) ∈ M˜n is the dual optimizer for qˆn(p˜n) units of claim B in that it achieves the infimum
in (2.7). To perform the asymptotic analysis we assume consistency (in n) between the markets and non-
degeneracy in prices as n ↑ ∞. More precisely:
Assumption 4.1. For Bn, B¯n as in (4.1) we have
(4.5) B := lim sup
n↑∞
Bn < lim inf
n↑∞
B¯n =: B¯.
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Remark 4.2. Let Assumption 3.3 hold. Then, since Bn ≤ dn ≤ B¯n for all n it follows that B ≤ d ≤ B¯
(recall the definitions of dn and d as given in Assumption 3.3). Assumption 4.1 strengthens this to say that
there are p˜ 6= d so that p˜ is arbitrage free for all n large enough. In particular, there are In ∋ p˜n → p˜ 6= d.
Now, Assumption 4.1 may fail in two ways. First of all, it may be that In is collapsing to the singleton d as
n ↑ ∞. In this case, convergence of limiting prices is trivial since pnan(qn)→ d for all sequences {qn}. The
second way in which Assumption 4.1 may fail is if there is no consistency between markets in that there is
no price p˜ 6= d such that p˜ ∈ In for all n large. Here, we do not have optimizers (along a subsequence) qˆn.
Under Assumption 4.1, we present the first main result, which says that optimal positions are becoming
large at a rate which grows at least like ℓrn for some ℓ 6= 0.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.3 and 4.1 hold. For In ∋ p˜n → p˜ we have
• If p˜ < d then
lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
> 0.
• If p˜ > d then
lim inf
n↑∞
−qˆn(p˜n)
rn
> 0.
The problem of obtaining upper bounds for lim supn↑∞ |qˆn(p˜n)|/rn is more subtle. First of all we need
to identify the maximal range where pnan(ℓrn) converges. To do this, set
(4.6) δ+ := sup
{
k > 0 : lim
n↑∞
pnan(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ), ∀ 0 < ℓ < k
}
∈ [δ,∞].
(4.7) δ− := inf
{
k < 0 : lim
n↑∞
pnan(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ), ∀ 0 > ℓ > k
}
∈ [−∞,−δ].
As discussed in Section 3.1, pnan(q) is decreasing in q and hence p
∞(ℓ) is decreasing in ℓ. Therefore, the
limits
(4.8) p∞(δ+) := lim
ℓ↓δ−
p∞(ℓ); p∞(δ−) := lim
ℓ↑δ+
p∞(ℓ),
exist. Furthermore, since Bn < pnan(ℓrn) < B¯n for all ℓ ∈ R we have B ≤ p∞(δ+) ≤ p∞(δ−) ≤ B¯,
however, as the example in Section 4.2 below shows, each of these inequalities may be strict. In particular,
the range of limiting indifference prices along the rate rn may deviate from the arbitrage free prices.
With this notation, we now provide the corresponding upper bounds for optimal positions.
Theorem 4.4. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.3 and 4.1 hold. Define δ+, δ− as in (4.6) and (4.7) respectively.
For In ∋ p˜n → p˜ we have
• If p∞(δ+) < p˜ < d then
lim sup
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
< δ+.
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• If d < p˜ < p∞(δ−) then
lim sup
n↑∞
−qˆn(p˜n)
rn
< −δ−.
Note the strict inequality above implies, for example, that when δ+ =∞we have lim supn↑∞ qˆn(p˜n)/rn <
∞. Lastly, let us discuss when one actually has true convergence. As seen in Section 3.1 the map
ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ) is concave. Here, we strengthen this by assuming:
Assumption 4.5. The function ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ) is strictly concave on (δ−, δ+).
Then, we have the following Corollary which ensures the limit qˆn/rn actually exists:
Corollary 4.6. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.3, 4.1 and 4.5 hold. Define δ+, δ− as in (4.6) and (4.7) respec-
tively. Let In ∋ p˜n → p˜. If p∞(δ+) < p˜ 6= d < p∞(δ−) then
lim
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
= ℓ ∈ (δ−, δ+) \ {0}.
The proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 and of Corollary 4.6 are in Appendix B.
4.2. Discussion. Presently, we point out some conclusions and subtleties associated to the above results.
First, when we put together Theorems 4.3, 4.4 we see that if the price p˜n ∈ In converges to p˜ where
p∞(δ+) < p˜ < p∞(δ−), p 6= d then up to subsequences we have qˆn(p˜n)/rn → ℓ ∈ (δ−, δ+) \ {0}, which
by Corollary 4.6 becomes true convergence if ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ) is strictly concave. Note also that by (3.7), under
optimal positions we have convergence of indifference prices as well, i.e. pnan(qˆn(p˜
n))→ p∞(ℓ).
Second, assume for example that δ+ =∞. Then, another straightforward calculation shows (recall (4.5))
B < p˜ < lim
ℓ↑∞
p∞(ℓ) =⇒ lim
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜)
rn
=∞,
provided of course such a p˜ exists. This offers a converse to Theorem 4.4.
Third, let us briefly discuss the degenerate case where rn is (chosen) such that p∞(ℓ) = d for all ℓ ∈
(δ−, δ
+). In this case, a range of different phenomena can occur. For illustration purposes, we consider
the following example, taken from [34]. In the nth market, the claim decomposes into a replicable piece
Dn (with replicating capital dn) and a piece Yn which is independent of Sn. Now, assume Yn ∼ N(0, γn)
under P and fix the risk aversion an ≡ a. Here, the indifference price is
pna(q) = dn −
1
aq
log
(
E
[
e−aqYn
])
= dn − 1
2
aqγ2n.
The range of arbitrage free prices is maximal: i.e. Bn = −∞, B¯n = ∞. For p˜n ∈ R the optimal
purchase quantity found by minimizing qp˜n − qpna(q) is
qˆn(p˜
n) = − p˜
n − dn
aγ2n
.
Now, assume that γn → 0, dn → d. With rn = γ−2n → ∞, Assumption 3.3 holds with p∞(ℓ) =
d − (1/2)aℓ, δ− = −∞ and δ+ = ∞. Note that ℓp∞(ℓ) = ℓd − (1/2)aℓ2 is strictly concave. Here, if
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p˜n → p˜ ∈ R we have that
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
= − p˜
n − dn
a
→ − p˜− d
a
.
So, both Theorems 4.3, 4.4 hold.
Now, change rn so that rn = γ−1n → ∞. Then, Assumption 3.3 still holds with p∞(ℓ) = d, δ− = −∞
and δ+ =∞. In this instance, however, the map ℓp∞(ℓ) = ℓd is not strictly concave. Here, if p˜n → p˜ ∈ R
(which is still arbitrage free since this property does not depend upon rn) we have
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
= − p˜
n − dn
aγn
.
So, if p˜ < d the ratio goes to∞, if p˜ > d the ratio goes to−∞ and if p˜ = d then a variety of phenomena can
occur depending on the rates at which γn → 0, p˜n → p˜ and dn → d. Even though the behavior is degenerate
in this case, it does not contradict either Theorem 4.3 or 4.4. In particular, Theorem 4.4 is vacuous in this
case since p∞(ℓ) = d for all ℓ.
The above example is related to the well known fact from Large Deviations that a LDP may hold for the
same sequence of random variables with two different rates {rn} , {r′n} with rn/r′n → 0. The resulting rate
functions however, in an analogous manner to the resultant limiting indifference prices above, may provide
drastically different levels of information.
4.3. On the Normalized Optimal Wealth Process. For a given n, fixed risk aversion a and position size
qn, recall the optimal wealth process Xˆna (qn) from Section 2. Heuristically, as |qn| → ∞ one expects
Xˆna (qn), as well as the optimal strategy πˆna (qn), to grow on the order of |qn|. However, if we normalize the
wealth process by the position size then it is reasonable to ask if some type of convergence takes place. To
this end we define the normalized wealth process X˜ via
(4.9) X˜na (qn) :=
1
qn
Xˆna (qn).
Note that X˜na (qn) is in fact a wealth process, obtained from the (acceptable) normalized optimal trading
strategy π˜na (qn) = (1/qn)πˆna (qn). We wish to stress that convergence of the normalized optimal wealth
process is a topic on its own and we do not study it in this paper. However, we mention some interesting
and motivating straightforward conclusions.
Let us come back to (2.6), re-written here as −auna(0)e−aqnpna (qn) = E
[
e−qna(X˜
n
a (qn)T+B)
]
. Since
−auna(0) ≤ 1 we immediately see that
(4.10) E
[
e−qna(X˜
n
a (qn)T+B−p
n
a (qn))
]
= −auna(0) ≤ 1.
By Markov’s inequality we have the elementary estimate:
P
[
X˜na (qn)T +B − pn(qn) ≤ −γ
]
≤ e−qnaγ ; γ ∈ R.
Thus, we see that for any qn ↑ ∞ the portfolio obtained by buying one unit of B for pna(qn) and trading
according to the normalized optimal trading strategy provides a super-hedge of 0 in P−probability in that
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for all γ > 0
(4.11) lim
n↑∞
P
[
X˜na (qn)T +B − pna(qn) ≤ −γ
]
= 0,
and in fact, the convergence to 0 is exponentially fast. This result essentially follows because of risk aversion
and is valid under the minimal Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. If we consider optimal positions then one can say
more and characterize the super-hedge more precisely. We first adapt the set-up of [30] and enforce the
following assumptions on the claim B and filtration F:
Assumption 4.7. B is bounded: i.e. ‖B‖L∞ <∞.
Assumption 4.8. The filtration F is continuous.
Under Assumptions 4.7, 4.8, Theorem 13 of [30], says that for any qn
(4.12) qnB = qnpna(qn) +
a
2
〈Lˆna(qn)〉T − Lˆna(qn)T − Xˆna (qn)T + Xˆna (0)T ,
where Lˆna(qn) is a Qn0 martingale strongly orthogonal to Sn under Qn0 . Dividing by qn and setting L˜na(qn) =
(1/qn)Lˆ
n
a(qn) as the normalized orthogonal Qn0 martingale we obtain
(4.13) X˜na (qn) +B − pna(qn) =
aqn
2
〈L˜na(qn)〉T − L˜na(qn)T +
1
qn
Xˆna (0).
Next, as shown in [30, Theorem 19], supn
(
qnE
Qn0
[
〈L˜na(qn)〉T
])
< ∞, which implies that L˜na(qn)T goes
to 0 in Qn0 -L2 as qn → ∞. Lastly, to evaluate (1/qn)Xˆna (0)T as qn → ∞ we impose the following mild
asymptotic no arbitrage condition (see [33, pp. 9]):
Assumption 4.9. lim supn↑∞H (Qn0 | P) <∞.
Assumption 4.9 implies (1/qn)Xˆna (0)T goes to 0 in Qn0 probability as qn → ∞. Indeed, using the first
order relation in (2.5) a straight-forward calculation shows that for any ε, qn > 0 that
Qn0
[
1
qn
Xˆna (0)T ≥ ε
]
≤ eH(Qn0 | P)−aqnε;
Qn0
[
1
qn
Xˆna (0)T ≤ −ε
]
≤ H (Q
n
0 | P) + e−1
εaqn +H (Qn0 | P)
,
from which the statement immediately follows. With these preparations, now consider when, additionally,
Assumptions 3.3 and 4.1 hold, and positions are taking optimally: i.e. qn = qˆn = qˆn(p˜n) where In ∋ p˜n →
p˜ with p∞(δ+) < p˜ < p∞(δ−), p 6= d. Then, from Theorems 4.3, 4.4 we have up to subsequences (or,
under the Assumptions of Corollary 4.6, for all subsequences) that qˆn/rn → ℓ ∈ (δ−, δ+) \ {0} and that
pna(qˆn)→ p∞(ℓ). Thus, we obtain that in Qn0 -probability
(4.14) X˜na (qˆn)T +B − p∞(ℓ)−
aqˆn
2
〈Lna(qˆn)〉T → 0,
which implies that the excess hedge is precisely aqˆn〈L˜na(qn)〉T /2 in Qn0−probability limit as n→∞. Even
though this result is interesting, one would like to have the same statement under the P measure. This is true
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if the measure P is contiguous with respect to the measure Qn0 , i.e. that Qn0 (An) → 0 implies P(An) → 0
for every sequence of measurable sets {An}n∈N, e.g. Chapter 6 of [39]. The classical Le Cam’s first lemma
(Lemma 6.4 in [39]) provides sufficient and necessary conditions for contiguity.
Lastly, assume that qn = q is fixed and come back to (4.13). Taking expectations yields
dn − pna(q) =
aq
2
EQ
n
0
[
〈Lˆna(q)〉T
]
,
where we recall that dn = EQ
n
0 [B]. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, Assumption 3.3 implies pna(q) → d
and hence limn↑∞ EQ
n
0
[
〈Lˆna(q)〉T
]
= 0 which in turn implies that both 〈Lˆna(q)〉T , Lˆna(q)T go to zero in
Qn0 probability as n → ∞. Therefore, for fixed position sizes, we have in view of (4.13), that X˜na (q)T −
(1/q)Xˆna (0)T +B−d goes to zero in Qn0 probability and hence, under the additional contiguity assumption,
the claim is asymptotically hedgeable. This makes precise the connection between Assumption 3.3 and
vanishing hedging errors mentioned in Section 3.1.2.
4.4. On a Characterization of rn. As in the previous section, we let Assumptions 2.2, 3.3, 4.7 and 4.8
hold. Using the results of [30], we give a characterization for rn which in a sense justifies the interpretation
of rn as the speed at which the market becomes complete. Recalling (3.5), (4.12) and the normalized
orthogonal martingale L˜na(qn) we get
dn = p
n
a(qn) +
aqn
2
EQ
n
0
[
〈L˜na(qn)〉T
]
.
Now, let qn = ℓrn for some |ℓ| < δ (which, by Corollary 4.6 and (3.7) essentially includes the case of
optimal positions). We thus have
(4.15) lim
n↑∞
rn
2
EQ
n
0
[
〈L˜na(ℓrn)〉T
]
=
d− p∞(ℓ)
aℓ
.
This conforms to the “asymptotically complete” case. The normalized hedging error under optimal
positions qˆn ≈ ℓrn is approximately (up to a multiplicative constant) EQn0
[
〈L˜na(ℓrn)〉T
]
. If the market is
becoming complete we expect that for n→∞
EQ
n
0
[
〈L˜na(ℓrn)〉T
]
→ 0.
The speed at which it goes to 0 thus becomes r−1n and at this scaling we have convergence of prices.
In Sections 6 and 7 we study a number of examples where rn can be computed explicitly. One would
like to have an abstract formula that explicitly characterizes rn, as (4.15) contains rn within the normalized
hedging error 〈L˜na(ℓrn)〉. Notice that (4.15) holds for all |ℓ| < δ. So, one is tempted to take limits as ℓ→ 0
on both sides, and, if one can interchange the n ↑ ∞ limit with the ℓ → 0 limit, pass the latter limit inside
the expectation, and if p∞(ℓ) is both strictly decreasing and differentiable at ℓ = 0, then for n large enough
rn ≈ −2p˙
∞(0)
a
× 1
EQ
n
0
[
〈L˜na(0)〉T
] .
Here, the interpretation of r−1n as a market incompleteness factor is much more transparent. Indeed, define
Xˇn, Lˇn through the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition of −B with respect to the subspace of L2(Qn0 ;FT )
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generated by trading in Sn so that B = EQn0 [B]− LˇnT − XˇnT . Then, as shown in [30, Section 6.1] we have
the following limits in L2(Qn0 ;FT )
lim
q↓0
L˜na(q)T = LˇT ; lim
q↓0
(
X˜na (q)T −
1
q
Xˆna (0)T
)
= XˇnT .
In other words, L˜na(0) describes the hedging error associated to B, with size EQ
n
0
[
〈L˜na(0)〉T
]
∝ r−1n . Thus
r−1n acts as the market incompleteness factor, and, as the market becomes complete, we see that rn →∞.
The derivation of this statement is of course heuristic. Rigorous proof of this result seems to be quite
hard, but we nevertheless present the argument as it provides more intuition into the problem. We choose to
leave the rigorous derivation of this result and further consequences as a future interesting work.
4.5. Optimal Position Taking for General Utilities. The optimal position taking results in Theorems 4.3
and 4.4 readily extend to general utility functions on the real line. This essentially follows from [33].
Throughout this section we fix the risk aversion at a > 0. Define Ua as the class of utility functions on R
(i.e. U ∈ C2(R), strictly increasing and strictly concave) satisfying
• The absolute risk aversion of U is bounded between two positive constants: i.e. for 0 < aU < a¯U :
(4.16) aU ≤ αu(x) := −
U ′′(x)
U ′(x)
≤ a¯U ; x ∈ R.
• U decays exponentially with rate a for large negative wealths: i.e.
(4.17) lim
x↓−∞
−1
x
log(−U(x)) = a.
By (4.16) it follows that U is bounded from above on R and hence through a normalization we assume
0 = U(∞) = limx↑∞ U(x). From [33, Section 2.2] it holds that U ∈ Ua satisfies both the Inada con-
ditions limx↓−∞ U ′(x) = ∞, limx↑∞ U ′(x) = 0 and the Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity conditions
lim infx↓−∞ xU
′(x)/U(x) > 1, lim supx↑∞ xU
′(x)/U(x) < 1. Similarly to (2.2) and (2.3), define the
value function in the nth market with initial capital x and q units of the claim as unU (x, q), where if q = 0
we write unU (x). Analogously to (2.4), set pnU (x, q) as the (average, bid) utility indifference price defined
through the equation
(4.18) unU (x− qpnU (x, q), q) = unU (x).
So that pnU (x, q) is well defined for x, q ∈ R we assume the claim is bounded: i.e. we enforce Assumption
4.7. Under Assumptions 2.2, 4.7 it follows from [32] that for x, q ∈ R, pnU (x, q) is well defined, arbitrage
free, decreasing in q with limits (recall (4.2)) limq↓−∞ pn(x, q) = B¯n, limq↑∞ pn(x, q) = Bn, for each n.
To connect limiting prices for U with those for the exponential utility we additionally enforce the as-
ymptotic no arbitrage condition in Assumption 4.9, and recall that using [33, Theorem 3.3], it follows from
Assumptions 2.2, 3.3, 4.7 and 4.9 that for all x ∈ R and 0 < |ℓ| < δ:
(4.19) lim
n↑∞
pnU (x, ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ).
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As for ℓ = 0, since Assumption 3.3 implies p∞ is continuous at 0, the monotonicity of pnU(x, q) yields for
0 < ℓ < δ that
p∞(ℓ) = lim
n↑∞
pnU(x, ℓrn) ≤ lim inf
n↑∞
pnU(x, 0) ≤ lim sup
n↑∞
pnU(x, 0) ≤ lim
n↑∞
pnU (x,−ℓrn) = p∞(−ℓ),
so that taking ℓ ↓ 0 we obtain that pnU (x, 0) → p∞(0). Now, for a given arbitrage free price p˜n ∈ In, we
consider the optimal purchase problem
(4.20) sup
q∈R
(unU (x− p˜nq, q)) .
Unlike for the exponential case when the results of [24] yield a unique maximizer, here, to the best our
our knowledge, there are no known results on existence/uniqueness of optimizers (see [36] for results with
utility functions defined on the positive axis). However, the main results of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 still hold,
as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 4.10. Let Assumptions 2.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.7 and 4.9 hold. Assume that In ∋ p˜n → p˜. Let x ∈ R be
fixed and recall δ+, δ− from (4.6), (4.7) respectively. Then
• For each n there exists an optimizer qˆn = qˆn(x, p˜n) to (4.20).
• If p∞(δ+) < p˜ < d then for any sequence of maximizers {qˆn}:
(4.21) 0 < lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
< lim sup
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
< δ+.
• If d < p˜ < p∞(δ−) then for any sequence of maximizers {qˆn}:
(4.22) 0 < lim inf
n↑∞
−qˆn
rn
< lim sup
n↑∞
−qˆn
rn
< −δ−.
Remark 4.11. As with the exponential case, a sufficient condition for the limits to exist in (4.21) and (4.22)
is Assumption 4.5.
5. ON PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM PRICE QUANTITY AND ITS LIMITING BEHAVIOR
The concept of indifference pricing has a subjective nature, in the sense that the indifference price of an
investor is a way she values unhedgeable positions, and whether or not there is a counter-party to offset a
transaction is a different question. In particular, so far we have assumed that a sequence of prices p˜n ∈
In converges to p˜, without mentioning whether such prices equilibrate any transactions among different
investors. In this section, we address this issue and we justify that such sequence of prices could indeed be
the equilibrium prices of the given claim B among (two) investors.
For this, we adapt the notion of the partial equilibrium price quantity (PEPQ). Provided that the stock
dynamics are exogenously specified, the equilibrium price of a claim B is the one at which the investors’
optimal quantities of the claim sum up to zero, meaning that the market of the claim is cleared out (the
word partial refers to the fact the investors specify the equilibrium of the claim and not the stock market).
Essentially, the main motivation of this section is to study under Assumption 3.3 when our main optimal
position taking results could arise in an equilibrium setting whether all investors act optimally and the price
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p˜n is the equilibrium price in the nth market of a given claim B. In short, the analysis of this section prove
that if the investors’ risky exposures (random endowments) are dominated by rn, then p˜n → d. However,
if investors’ endowments are growing like rn, equilibrium prices p˜n could converge to a limit different than
d and the results of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 occur. The latter situation, which happens when at least one investor
has an already undertaken large position in B, means that there are cases where the large regime is in fact
the market’s equilibrium, and even more interestingly the equilibrium prices converge to a price different
than the unique limiting arbitrage free price.
In the setting of a locally bounded semi-martingale stock market, bounded claims, and exponential utility
maximizers, the PEPQ is analyzed in [1]. Specified to the current setup of Section 2, we assume, for each
n, there is a group of I investors such that each investor i is endowed with a exogenously given random
endowment, denoted by E in. For a given bounded claim B, the investors also wish to trade B amongst
themselves in such a way that acting optimally (in terms of utility maximization) the market for the claim
clears.
For simplicity, we consider the presence of two investors, although we should point out that the results
of this section can be generalized for markets with more investors. Recall that In from (4.2) denotes the
(non-empty) range of arbitrage free prices for B and let ain > 0 denote the risk aversion coefficient for
investor i. Before we give the exact definition of the PEPQ for a claim B, we need to introduce the notation
for the indirect utility and the indifference pricing under the presence of random endowment. Namely, for
the random endowment E in and position size q in B, define, in a similar manner to (2.2), the value function
for investor i by
(5.1) unain(x, q|E
n
i ) := sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uain(x+X
πn
T + qB + E in)
]
; i = 1, 2.
Similarly to (2.4), the average (bid) indifference price of the investor i with random endowment Eni at the
nth market is denoted by pnain(q|E
i
n) and is given as the solution of
(5.2) unain(x− qp
n
ain
(q|E in), q|E in) = unain(x|E
i
n); i = 1, 2.
Note that the indifference price’s independence on the (constant) initial wealth still holds under the presence
of the random endowment, which means that we can again assume x = 0. Next, for a given pn ∈ In,
consider the optimal purchase quantity problem for investor i defined by identifying (compare with (4.3)):
(5.3) qˆin(pn) = argmax
q∈R
(
unain(−qp
n, q|E in)
)
; i = 1, 2.
As shown in Proposition 5.5 in [1], the optimization problem (5.3) admits a representation similar to the
corresponding problem without random endowment (see (B.1)). Namely, we have that
(5.4) qˆin(pn) ∈ argminq∈R
(
qp˜n − qpnain(q|E
i
n)
)
.
A PEPQ is then defined as a pair (pn∗ , qn∗ ) ∈ In × R such that
qn∗ = qˆ
1
n(p
n
∗ ) and − qn∗ = qˆ2n(pn∗ ).
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In other words, at price pn∗ it is optimal for investor 1 to buy qn∗ and investor 2 to sell qn∗ units of B, thus the
market clears out. Taking representation (5.4) into account, it is then a matter of simple calculations to get
the following condition for the PEPQ for each n (see also Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 5.7 in [1]):
(5.5) qn∗ = argmax
q∈R
(
q
(
pna1n(q|E
n
1 ) + p
n
a2n
(−q|En2 )
))
.
The equilibrium price pn∗ is then given by
(5.6) pn∗ = EQ
n
1 (q
n
∗ ) [B] = EQ
n
2 (−q
n
∗ ) [B] ,
where Qni (q) denotes the dual optimizer in M˜n for the position qB+Eni and risk aversion ain (recall the first
order condition (4.4) without random endowment)†. According to Theorem 5.8 in [1], for a non-replicable
bounded claim B (i.e. satisfying Assumption 4.7) a PEPQ (pn∗ , qn∗ ) ∈ In×R always exists for each n ∈ N,
and it is unique with qn∗ 6= 0 if and only if a1nEn1 − a2nEn2 is non-replicable.
Now, consider when n ↑ ∞ and Assumption 3.3 holds for each sequence {ain}n∈N. The questions that
naturally arise are where the sequence of the equilibrium prices converges to and under which conditions
the regime of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 occurs. As n ↑ ∞, if one ignores the position size and has non-vanishing
risk aversion, the hedging error of positions in B approaches zero and hence it is expected that equilibrium
prices converge to price d. It turns out that this is the case provided however that the size of the investors’
endowments is dominated by the “market incompleteness” parameter rn from Assumption 3.3. When at
least one of the endowments increases with n sufficiently fast, the equilibrium prices may converge to a
limit different than d, which implies a situation similar to the regime of Theorems 4.3, 4.4. In the sequel we
provide a family of such examples where the endowment of one of the investor is an increasing position on
the claim B.
Before, we present the precise arguments we should clarify how Assumption 3.3 works in the case of two
investors, i = 1, 2. The statement that Assumption 3.3 holds for function pn
ain
: R 7→ In (defined in (2.4)),
means that there exist a sequence
{
rin
}
n∈N
of positive reals with rin ր ∞ and a constant δi > 0 such that
for all |ℓ| < δi the limit p∞i (ℓ) := limn↑∞ pnain(ℓr
i
n) exists, is finite and limℓ→0 p∞i (ℓ) = d. Note that it
readily follows from the relation pna2n(q) = p
n
a1n
(qa2n/a
1
n) (which holds for each n) that if Assumption 3.3
holds for function pna1n , it will also hold for function p
n
a2n
provided that the sequence {a2n/a1n}n∈N is bounded
away from zero and infinity. For this, we could set r2n := r1na2n/a1n (possibly going to an increasing
subsequence), p∞2 = p∞1 and δ2 = δ1.
For the proofs of this section we need to introduce the notion of the (bid) indifference price for every
arbitrary bounded payoff C ∈ L∞ under risk aversion an > 0 in the nth market, denoted by Pnan(C) and
defined as the solution of the following equation
(5.7) sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uan(x+X
πn
T + C − Pnan(C))
]
= sup
πn∈An
E
[
Uan(x+X
πn
T )
]
; i = 1, 2.
†Note that Qni (0) is not necesarily Qn0 due to the presence of Eni .
THE PRICING OF CONTINGENT CLAIMS AND OPTIMAL POSITIONS IN ASYMPTOTICALLY COMPLETE MARKETS 19
Note that under this notation qpnan(q) = P
n
an(qB), for all q ∈ R with pnan defined in (2.4). The following
Lemma generalizes the findings of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 under the presence of random endowment provided
that the endowment is dominated by the associated rn.
Lemma 5.1. Let Assumptions 2.2, 4.1, 4.7 hold and impose Assumption 3.3 for function pn
ain
: R 7→ In. If
for i = 1, 2, Eni ∈ L∞, for each n and ||Eni ||L∞/rin → 0, then the statements of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 hold
also for the function pn
ain
(·|Eni ) : R 7→ In.
Proof. In view of the proof of Theorem 4.3 and under the imposed assumptions, we first have to show
that function pnain(·|E
n
i ) : R 7→ In satisfies Assumption A.5. Indeed, the first bullet point follows by a
simple change of measure dPni /dP := cni e−a
i
nE
n
i , for some constant cni and the corresponding variational
representation of the indifference price (2.7) considered under measure Pni ; while the second bullet point
readily follows by the boundedness of claim B. For the third and forth items, it is enough to show that for
all |ℓ| < δi, limn→∞ pnain(ℓr
i
n|Eni ) = p∞i (ℓ). For this, we note that the indifference price of an exponential
utility maximizer under some random endowment can be written as the difference of two indifference prices
without endowments (see among others, Appendix of [1] and recall definition (5.7)):
(5.8) qpnain(q|E
n
i ) = P
n
ain
(qB + Eni )− Pnain(E
n
i ), ∀q ∈ R,
Hence, for any |ℓ| < δi
pnain
(ℓrin|Eni ) =
Pnain
(ℓrinB + Eni )− Pnain(E
n
i )
ℓrin
≤ pnain(ℓr
i
n) + 2
||Eni ||L∞
|ℓ|rin
→ p∞i (ℓ),
where the limiting argument follows by the imposed assumptions on function pnain and E
n
i . We similarly
show that pnain(ℓr
i
n|Eni ) ≥ pnain(ℓr
i
n) − 2 ||E
n
i ||L∞
|ℓ|rin
→ p∞i (ℓ), which finishes the proof that function q 7→
pnain
(q|Eni ) satisfies Assumption A.5. We then observe that requirements of Proposition A.6 are also met for
function pnain(·|E
n
i ) : R 7→ In, since by (5.8) it readily follows that pnain(∞|E
n
i ) = p
n
ain
(∞). Hence, the rest
of the proof follows the same argument lines as the ones in proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4. 
Returning to the PEPQ, we exclude trivial cases for each n ∈ N by imposing the following assumption.
Assumption 5.2. For each n, Eni ∈ L∞ for both i = 1, 2 and a1nEn1 − a2nEn2 is non-replicable.
As mentioned above, this assumption guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of the PEPQ (pn∗ , qn∗ )
for each n with qn∗ 6= 0. Imposing Assumption 3.3 for indifference prices of both investors, we first address
the conditions that give the convergence of the equilibrium prices to d.
Proposition 5.3. Let Assumptions 2.2, 4.1, 4.7, 5.2 hold, and impose Assumption 3.3 for function pna1n(q)
and Assumption 4.5 for function qp∞1 (q). If we further assume that ||Eni ||L∞/r1n → 0, for both i = 1, 2 and
the sequence {a2n/a1n}n∈N is bounded away from zero and infinity, the sequence of the partial equilibrium
prices pn∗ of claim B converges to d.
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Proof. Let pn∗ denote an arbitrarily chosen convergent subsequence of the equilibrium prices of B with limit
pˆ (note that B ∈ L∞ guarantees the existence of such subsequence) and assume that pˆ 6= d, and in particular
pˆ < d.
Under Assumptions 4.7 and 5.2, it follows by Theorem 5.1 of [24] that the map q 7→ qpnain(q|E
n
i ) is
strictly concave for each i = 1, 2, and also that
(5.9) EQni (q) [B] = ∂
∂q
qpnain(q|E
n
i ).
Now, that EQn1 (0) [B] 6= EQn2 (0) [B] holds due to Assumption 5.2. Thus, first assume for some subsequence
(still labeled n) that EQn1 (0) [B] > EQn2 (0) [B], for sufficiently large n. Then qn∗ > 0 and in fact EQ
n
1 (0) [B] >
pn∗ > E
Qn2 (0) [B]. In view of Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 5.1, we have that the inequality pˆ < d implies the
existence of a further subsequence of qn∗ (still labeled n) such that limn→∞ qn∗ /r1n = ℓ > 0. We reach
then a contradiction if we show that for sufficiently large n, the position −qn∗ is not optimal for investor
2. Since pˆ < d, we get from Assumption 3.3 that there exists c > 0 such that for any sufficiently large n,
pn∗ < E
Qn0 [B]− c. This implies that
0 ≤ (−qn∗ )
(
pna2n(−q
n
∗ |En2 )− pn∗
)
< (−qn∗ )
(
pna2n(−q
n
∗ |En2 )− EQ
n
0 [B] + c
)
,
where the first inequality holds because the position −qn∗ is optimal for investor 2 at price pn∗ , for each n.
Using the relation (5.8) and the representation (2.7) we get that (recall definition (5.2))
0 <
Pna2n
(−qn∗B + En2 )
qn∗
−
Pna2n
(En2 )
qn∗
+ EQ
n
0 [B]− c
= inf
Q∈M˜n
{
EQ
[
−B + E
n
2
qn∗
]
+
1
a2nq
n
∗
(H (Q | P)−H (Qn0 | P))
}
−
Pna2n
(En2 )
qn∗
+ EQ
n
0 [B]− c
≤ EQn0
[En2
qn∗
]
−
Pna2n
(En2 )
qn∗
− c ≤ 2 ||E
n
2 ||L∞
qn∗
− c = 2 ||E
n
2 ||L∞
r1n
r1n
qn∗
− c.
Since ||En2 ||L∞/r1n → 0 and r1n/qn∗ → 1/ℓ it follows that c ≤ 0, a contradiction since c > 0. Similarly,
when EQn1 (0) [B] < EQn2 (0) [B], for sufficiently large n, then qn∗ < 0 and up to a subsequence qn∗ /r2n →
−ℓ < 0. In this case, we follow the same arguments to show that the position −qn∗ could not be optimal for
the investor 1 for sufficiently large n. Finally, the case where pˆ > d is symmetric to the analysis above and
hence omitted. 
Withdrawing however the assumption ||Eni ||L∞/rn → 0 could give the interesting cases where the equi-
librium prices converge to a price different than the unique arbitrage free price of the limiting market and the
regime of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 occurs. A family of such examples are presented in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5.4. Let Assumptions 2.2, 4.1 and 4.7 hold. Impose also Assumption 3.3 for function pn1 (p)
with constant risk aversion equal to 1 and Assumption 4.5 for the corresponding function qp∞(q). If for
each n ∈ N and i = 1, 2, ain ≡ ai and Eni ≡ bni B, for some ai > 0 and bni ∈ R, the following statements
hold:
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i. For each market n ∈ N, the unique PEPQ pair (pn∗ , qn∗ ) is given by q∗n = (a2bn2 − a1bn1 )/(a1 + a2)
and pn∗ = EQ
−abn
[B], with 1/a := 1/a1 + 1/a2 and bn := bn1 + bn2 .
ii. Letting for each n ∈ N, bn2 = κrn, for some κ ∈ (0, δ+/a) and bn1 = b1 ∈ R, we get that
limn→∞ q
n
∗ /rn = ℓ > 0 and pn∗ → pˆ < d.
Proof. The proof of the first item i. is based on standard arguments of the related literature (see for example
Theorem 3.2 in [5]). We recall that the equilibrium quantity is the solution of the optimization problem
(5.5) and thanks to the strict concavity of the function q 7→ qpnai(q|Eni ) we get that for any q ∈ R and every
n ∈ N,
q
(
pna1(q|En1 ) + pna2(−q|En2 )
) ≤ bnpna(bn).
We then observe that in fact bnpna(bn) = qn∗
(
pna1(q
n
∗ |En1 ) + pna2(−qn∗ |En2 )
)
, which means that qn∗ is indeed
the equilibrium quantity. The fact that equilibrium price pn∗ equals to EQ
−abn
[B] readily follows by (5.6).
For the second item, we have that q∗n/rn = (a2κrn − a1b1)/(a1 + a2)→ a2κ/(a1 + a2) > 0. Since pn∗
is the equilibrium price for each n, we have that pn∗ < pn1 (qn∗ |En1 ), since qn∗ is optimal position for investor
1 at price pn∗ . Then by using the representation (5.8) as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we get that
lim
n→∞
pna1(q
∗
n|En1 ) = limn→∞ p
n
a1(a2κrn/(a1 + a2)) = p
∞(aκ).
Recall that pn∗ = EQ
−abn
[B] and note that strict concavity of the function q 7→ qpna1(q|En1 ) and equation
(5.9) give that pn∗ is decreasing in n and hence it has a limiting point pˆ. Thus, we have that limn→∞ p∗n =
pˆ ≤ p∞(aκ) < p∞(0) = d, where the last strict inequality follows by Assumption 4.5. 
Proposition 5.4 indicates that there are cases where the equilibrium quantity increases to infinity at the
same time where the equilibrium price is different than the limiting arbitrage free price. It is important to
point out here that both investors act optimally at that equilibrium prices even though the limiting price
is different than d. The essential element is of course that one of the investor is endowed with a large
position on the claim and she is willing to sell portion of her position at a price which induces the other
investor acting optimally to enter to a large claim regime too. In other words, Proposition 5.4 justifies the
large volume of some OTC derivative markets and the corresponding extreme prices as long as some of
the participants in the market are already exposed to a risk that is highly correlated with the payoff of the
tradeable derivatives. This situation fits to the observed extreme volumes and prices for example in the
Mortgage Backed Securities market in the recent years.
Remark 5.5. The proof of Proposition 5.4 can easily be generalized in the case where the endowments are
of the form Eni = bni B+Eni , with the choices of bni as in the Proposition 5.4 and Eni being bounded random
endowments such that ||Eni ||L∞/rn → 0.
6. EXAMPLES WHERE THE LIMITING SCALED INDIFFERENCE PRICE EXIST
The power of Assumption 3.3 is its validity in a wide variety of models. In this section we give four
well studied market model examples. Then, in the next section we pay particular attention to an example
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with transactions costs. Remarkably, even though the standard duality results no longer apply, a version of
Assumption 3.3 still holds and more importantly, so do the conclusions of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4.
6.1. Vanishing Risk Aversion in a Fixed Market. As shown Section 3.1.1 for a fixed market, if the risk
aversion vanishes (i.e. an → 0) then Assumption 3.3 holds with rn = a−1n and p∞(ℓ) = p1(ℓ). In
addition, as the class of acceptable trading strategies A is a cone it follows for any qn that πˆan(qn) =
(1/an)πˆ1(anqn). So, for qn = ℓrn = ℓ/an, not only do indifference prices trivially converge, but the
optimal trading strategy is explicitly known, i.e. it is (1/an)πˆ1(ℓ) = rnπˆ1(ℓ) = (qn/ℓ)πˆ1(ℓ). Note that in
this instance the normalized optimal trading strategy trivially converges but does not necessarily provide a
super hedge.
6.2. Basis Risk Model with High Correlation. This example is considered in detail in [12, 21, 33, 38]
amongst others. Here, we have for each n one risky asset Sn which evolves according to
dSnt
Snt
=µ(Yt)dt+ σ(Yt)
(
ρndWt +
√
1− ρ2ndW˜t
)
,
dYt =b(Yt)dt+ a(Yt)dWt,
where W and W˜ are two independent Brownian motions. The filtered probability space is the standard
two-dimensional augmented Wiener space. The coefficients a, b have appropriate regularity and are such
that Y has a unique strong solution taking values in an open subset E of R. Set λ := µ/σ as the market
price of risk and assume that σ2(y) > 0, y ∈ E and that λ is bounded on E. B = B(YT ) for some
continuous bounded function B on E. As shown in [33, Section 5.3], Bn = B = infy∈E B(y) and
B¯n = B¯ = supy∈E B(y) for all n. Set rn = (1 − ρ2n)−1. As shown in [38] (see also [33]), for a fixed risk
aversion a > 0 and ℓ ∈ R, ℓ 6= 0:
pna (ℓrn) = −
1
aℓ
log

E
[
e−ρn
∫ T
0
λ(Yt)dWt−
1
2
∫ T
0
λ2(Yt)dt−aℓB(YT )
]
E
[
e−ρn
∫ T
0
λ(Yt)dWt−
1
2
∫ T
0
λ2(Yt)dt
]

 .
For ℓ = 0 one has
dn = p
n
a(0) = E
Qn0 [B(YT )] =
E
[
e−ρn
∫ T
0 λ(Yt)dWt−
1
2
∫ T
0 λ
2(Yt)dtB(YT )
]
E
[
e−ρn
∫ T
0 λ(Yt)dWt−
1
2
∫ T
0 λ
2(Yt)dt
] .
Thus, if ρn → 1 (limit of high correlation) then rn →∞ and
lim
n↑∞
pna(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ) = − 1
aℓ
log
(
EQ
[
e−aℓB(YT )
])
; ℓ 6= 0;
lim
n↑∞
pna(0) = p
∞(0) = EQ [B(YT )] ,
where Q is the unique martingale measure in the ρ = 1 market where the filtration is restricted to FW .
Furthermore, using l’Hopital’s rule one obtains limℓ→0 p∞(ℓ) = EQ [B(YT )] = p∞(0) so that Assumption
3.3 is satisfied with δ =∞.
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6.3. Large Markets with Vanishing Trading Restrictions. The next example is simplified version of
the general semi-complete setup considered in [34]. Here, (Ω,F ,P) is assumed to support a sequence of
independent Brownian motions W 1,W 2, .... The filtration is the augmented version of FW 1,W 2,.... There is
a sequence of (potentially tradeable) assets S1, S2, ... with dynamics
dSit
Sit
= µidt+
i∑
j=1
σijdW jt ; i = 1, 2, 3, ...,
where µ = (µ1, µ2, ...) satisfies
∑∞
i=1(µ
i)2 <∞ and σ is the lower triangular square root of the symmetric
matrix Σ =
{
Σij
}
i,j=1,2,...
, assumed positive definite so that for some λ > 0 and all ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, ...) with∑∞
i=1(ξ
i)2 <∞, we have ξ′Σξ ≥ λξ′ξ.
The claim (as is typical in life insurance markets) is given as the sum of independent, FW i adapted
claims Bi: B =
∑∞
i=1B
i
. To make B well defined and amenable to large claim analysis we assume
E
[
eλB
i
]
<∞, i = 1, 2, ... and ∑∞i=1 log (E [eλBi]) <∞ for all λ ∈ R.
For n = 1, 2, ... we construct the nth market by restricting trading to the first n assets. Thus, as n ↑ ∞
the claim is asymptotically hedgeable, though for each n the market is incomplete. As shown in [34],
Bn = d
n + ess infP [Yn] and B¯n = dn + ess supP [Yn] where dn is the unique replicating capital for∑n
i=1B
i and Yn :=
∑∞
i=n+1B
i
. Under Assumption 3.3, dn → d = EQ0 [B] where Q0 is the unique
martingale measure in the limiting complete market.
Since
∑∞
i=1 log
(
E
[
eλB
i
])
<∞ for all λ ∈ R, we know that limn↑∞ E
[
Y 2n
]
= 0. Assume furthermore
that Yn is converging to 0 sufficiently fast so that it satisfies a LDP with scaling rn → ∞ and good rate
function I such that {I = 0} = {0}. Lastly, assume that for some δ > 0, |λ| < δ implies
(6.1) lim sup
n↑∞
1
rn
∞∑
i=n
log
(
E
[
eλrnB
i
])
<∞.
For example, this will hold if Bi ∼ N(0, δ2i ), with
∑∞
i=1 δ
2
i < ∞. Fix the risk aversion an = a > 0. As
shown in [34], at ℓ = 0 we have limn↑∞ pna(0) = d = p∞(0). Furthermore, for 0 < |ℓ| < δ/a
lim
n↑∞
pna(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ) = d− 1
aℓ
sup
y∈R
(−ℓay − I(y)).
Additionally, as can be deduced from I(y) = 0↔ y = 0, (6.1) and the lower-semicontinuity of I , it follows
that
lim
ℓ→0
1
aℓ
sup
y∈R
(−ℓay − I(y)) = 0,
so that p∞(ℓ)→ d = p∞(0) as ℓ→ 0. Thus, Assumption 3.3 holds. Lastly, it is also shown in [34] that for
all q ∈ R the normalized residual risk process Yˆ na (q) of (2.10) is precisely Yn and, as such, does not depend
upon q.
6.4. Black-Scholes-Merton Model with Vanishing Default Probability. This example is taken from [25]
and the setup is similar to that considered in [29]. Here, we consider the Black-Scholes-Merton model,
except that the stock may default at the first jump time of an independent Poisson process. The claim is a
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defaultable bond paying 1 if the stock has not defaulted by time T . The owner of the bond wishes to hedge
the claim by trading in Sn, but needs to take into account the event of default, since the stock is stuck at 0
after default occurs.
Fix n and let λn > 0. For each n, the probability space is assumed to support a Brownian motion W
as well as an independent Poisson process Nn with intensity λn. Denote by N˜n the compensated Poisson
process so that N˜nt = Nnt − λn(τn ∧ t), where τn = inf {t ≥ 0 : Nn = 1}. The filtration is that generated
by Nn and W , augmented so that it satisfies the usual conditions. The (single) risky asset Sn evolves
according to
dSnt
Snt−
= 1t≤τn (µdt+ σdWt)− dNnt ,
= 1t≤τn
(
(µ + λn)dt+ σdWt − dN˜nt
)
.
The claim is a defaultable bond which pays 1 if Sn defaults before T : i.e. B = 1τn≤T ‡. Here, Bn = 0 and
B¯n = 1, this is because we can equivalently change the default intensity to take any positive value. Thus,
Assumption 4.1 holds even though d = 1 and hence d 6∈ In for all n.
As shown in [25], una(0, q) = − 1aFn(0; q) where Fn(·; q) solves the ODE
F˙n(t; q)− λFn(t; q)− µ
2
2σ2
Fn(t; q) + min
φ
(
1
2
σ2φ2Fn(t; q) + λne
µ
σ2−φ
)
= 0; t ≤ T,
Fn(T ; q) = e−aq.
It is easy to see that the optimal φˆn in the above minimization satisfies φˆn(t; q)eφˆn(t;q) = λn(Fn(t; q))−1e
µ
σ2 ,
where one can show that Fn(t; q) > 0. Now, let λn ↓ 0 (vanishing default probabilities) and set rn =
− log(λn). With qn = ℓrn, one can show that for ℓ < 1/a:
lim
n↑∞
pna(ℓrn) = lim
n↑∞
− 1
ℓarn
log
(
Fn(0; ℓrn)
Fn(0; 0)
)
= p∞a (ℓ) = 1.
Since
lim
ℓ→0
p∞a (ℓ) = 1 = lim
n↑∞
pna(0),
we see that Assumption 3.3 is satisfied, though the map ℓ 7→ ℓp∞(ℓ) = ℓ is not strictly concave.
7. VANISHING TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTON MODEL
In this section we show that the existence of limiting indifference prices and the resultant statements
about optimal position taking even extend to models with frictions, where the standard duality results used
in Section 2 are not as fully developed (see [11] for a recent treatment of the topic). As such, this example
is given its own section.
‡As the claim depends upon n here it does not fit precisely into the setup of Section 2. However, as inspection of the Propositions
in Appendix A shows, the results of Theorems 4.3, 4.4 readily extend to a sequence of claims Bn if they are uniformly bounded.
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We consider the Black-Scholes-Merton model with proportional transactions costs, as studied in [4, 6,
10, 13, 20, 23, 27, 28, 35] amongst many others. We take the approach of [10] and especially [4, 23]. Using
the notation of [4], the stock S evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion
(7.1) dSt
St
= µdt+ σdWt; t ≤ T.
Here, the filtered probability space is the standard one-dimensional Wiener space. Now, fix a time t ≤ T
and s > 0 and assume St = s. Denote by X and Y respectively the processes of dollar holdings in
the money market and shares of stock owned associated to a trading strategy L,M where Lt = Mt = 0
and L represents the cumulative transfers (in shares of stock) from the money market to the stock and M
represents the cumulative transfers from the stock to the money market. We denote by At the set of (L,M)
where L,M are adapted, non-decreasing and left-continuous with Lt = Mt = 0. There is a proportional
transaction cost λ ∈ (0, 1) by trading. In other words, for a given initial position (x, y) where x ∈ R is the
initial capital and y ∈ R the initial shares held in S the corresponding processes evolve according to
Xτ = X
L,M,x,t
τ = x−
∫ τ
t
Su(1 + λ)dLu +
∫ τ
t
Su(1− λ)dMu; t ≤ τ ≤ T,
Yτ = Y
L,M,y,t
τ = y + Lτ −Mτ ; t ≤ τ ≤ T.
(7.2)
The claim B is a European call option on S: i.e. B = (ST − K)+, and suppose that the investor is
considering selling the call. For an exponential investor with fixed risk aversion a > 0 the value function
without the claim is given by
(7.3) ua(x, y; s, t, λ) = sup
L,M∈At
Es,t [Ua(XT + YTST )] .
Here, Es,t [·] refers to conditioning on time t given St = s. The value function for q units of the call is
(7.4) ua(x, y, q; s, t, λ) = sup
L,M∈At
Es,t
[
Ua(XT + YTST − q(ST −K)+)
]
.
The indifference price pa(x, y, q; s, t, λ) is then defined through the balance equation
(7.5) ua(x+ qpa(x, y, q; s, t, λ), y, q; s, t, λ) = ua(x, y; s, t, λ).
Remark 7.1. pa(x, y, q; s, t, λ) is thus the average ask indifference price, as opposed to the average bid
indifference price defined in Section 2. However, using the arguments of Section 2 and definition (5.7) for a
general claim B, the bid and ask prices are related by paska (q;B) = −pbida (q;−B), where pbida (q;B) denotes
the average bid price (1/q)P bida (qB).
Though the results in [4] are stated in the joint limit of vanishing transactions costs (i.e. λn → 0) and
infinite risk aversion (i.e. a = an →∞), they easily (as the authors therein mention) translate into asymp-
totics in the joint limit that λn → 0 and q = qn → ∞ for a fixed risk aversion a. This translation is made
precise in the following proposition.
26 MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS, SCOTT ROBERTSON, AND KONSTANTINOS SPILIOPOULOS
Proposition 7.2. Fix s > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ R, y ∈ R, λ ∈ (0, 1) and a > 0. The (ask) indifference price
pa is independent of x and hence write pa = pa(y, q; s, t, λ). Now, let λn → 0 and set rn := λ−2n . For
ℓ > 0 and qn = ℓrn = ℓλ−2n we have for all yn such that limn↑∞ λ3n|yn| = 0:
lim
n↑∞
pa(yn, qn; s, t, λn) = p
∞
a (ℓ; s, t) := Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ),
where for b > 0, Ψ(; b) : (0,∞)× [0, T ] 7→ R is the unique continuous viscosity solution to the non-linear
Black-Scholes PDE
Ψt +
1
2
σ2s2Ψss
(
1 + S(b2s2Ψss)
)
= 0; (s, t) ∈ (0,∞)× (0, T );
Ψ(s, T ) = (s−K)+; s ∈ (0,∞);
lim
s↑∞
Ψ(s, t)
s
= 1; t ≤ T uniformly in t.
(7.6)
Here, S : R 7→ (−1,∞) satisfies
S˙(A) =
1 + S(A)
2
√
AS(A)−A ; S(0) = 0; limA↓−∞S(A) = −1; limA↑∞S(A)/A = 1.
Remark 7.3. The above result allows for yn to vary since intuitively a position size of qn in the call would
be associated to an initial position of qny in the stock for some y ∈ R. Note that for yn = qny = ℓyλ−2n we
have λ3n|yn| → 0.
To obtain the optimal position taking results analogous to Theorems 4.3, 4.4, it is first necessary to
identify the range of limiting prices p∞a (ℓ; s, t) in Proposition 7.2 as ℓ varies between 0 and ∞. In other
words, we must consider asymptotics for Ψ(; b) for small and large b.
As b ↓ 0, Theorem 7.4 below proves continuity in that Ψ(s, t; b) → Ψ(s, t; 0). But, for b = 0, (7.6) is
just the regular Black-Scholes PDE which admits a unique (explicit) classical solution. Thus, as ℓ ↓ 0, the
limiting indifference price converges to the unique price in complete, λn = 0 market given St = s.
Theorem 7.4. Let Ψ(; b) : (0,∞) × [0, T ] 7→ R be the unique, continuous, viscosity solution to the non-
linear Black-Scholes PDE equation (7.6). Then as b → 0, we have locally uniformly that Ψ(; b) → Ψ(; 0),
where Ψ(; 0) is the unique continuous solution to the linear Black-Scholes PDE.
Next, we identify the limit of Ψ(; b) as b ↑ ∞. Here, we are guided by the intuition that, thought of as a
function of the stock volatility, the Black-Scholes price for a call option converges to the initial price as the
volatility becomes large. In fact, a similar phenomenon occurs here as b ↑ ∞, as the following shows:
Theorem 7.5. For fixed s > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T the map b 7→ Ψ(s, t; b) is increasing with
(7.7) lim
b↑∞
Ψ(s, t; b) =

(s−K)
+ t = T
s 0 ≤ t < T
.
Remark 7.6. An inspection of the proof of Theorem 7.4 below shows that Ψ(s, t; b) is continuously increas-
ing in b. Thus, if qn = ℓnrn where ℓn → ℓ ≥ 0 then the indifference prices converge to Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ).
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With the above asymptotics for p∞a (ℓ; s, t) in place, we now consider the optimal sale quantity problem in
the nth market with transactions cost λn. In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that given St = s
the investor has the opportunity to sell call options at a price p˜n in the nth market. To finance this sale, the
investor cashes out her initial position in the stock, receiving ys(1−λn) for the sale of y shares. Then, with
x+ ys(1− λn) in cash, she identifies the optimal number of options to sell by solving the problem
(7.8) sup
q>0
ua(x+ ys(1− λn) + qp˜n, 0, q; s, t, λn).
In the frictionless case, if p˜n is arbitrage free in the nth market, then (see [24]), an optimal qˆn exists
and is unique. When considering transactions costs, rather than identifying the arbitrage free prices in each
market, we use the small and large ℓ asymptotics for p∞a (ℓ; s, t) obtained in Theorems 7.4, 7.5 to identify a
maximal range of reasonable prices p˜n for which one can sell the option. Indeed, from the above theorems
lim
ℓ↓0
p∞a (ℓ; s, t) = Ψ(s, t; 0); lim
ℓ↑∞
p∞a (ℓ; s, t) = s.
It is well known that Ψ(s, t; 0) < s. Furthermore, if one is going to sell options, the effect of the transactions
costs is that the ask price should a) be at least as large as Ψ(s, t; 0) and b) be no higher than p since no-one
would buy at this price§. Thus, the only range of reasonable prices to sell at is (Ψ(s, t; 0), s). With this
motivation we have:
Theorem 7.7. Let p˜n ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) for each n with p˜n → p˜ where p˜ ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s). Let λn → 0. For
each n there exists a maximizer qˆn > 0 to (7.8). Additionally, for any sequence {qˆn}n∈N of maximizers:
(7.9) lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
> 0; lim sup
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
<∞.
Thus, up to subsequences, qˆn/rn → ℓ and hence for any sequence {yn}n∈N such that λ3n|yn| → 0:
lim
n↑∞
pa(yn, qˆn; s, t, λn) = p
∞
a (ℓ; s, t) = Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ).
APPENDIX A. TECHNICAL SUPPORTING RESULTS
The following propositions provide the main technical tools to prove the optimal position taking results
in both the frictionless and transactions cost cases. To seamlessly integrate with the transaction costs case,
results are separated into long and short positions.
§Technically: no one would buy at a price at or above p(1 + λn) because it would then be preferable to buy the stock and not
trade. For this to hold as λn ↓ 0, we require p˜n ≤ p. Our results are valid for p˜n < p.
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A.1. Long Positions. Assume:
Assumption A.1. {pn} is a family of functions defined on (0,∞) such that
• For each n, pn is non-increasing and continuous.
• There exists a γ > 0 such that lim supn↑∞ supq≤γ q|pn(q)| = C(γ) <∞.
• There exists rn →∞ and δ > 0 such that for 0 < ℓ < δ we have limn↑∞ pn(ℓrn) = p∞(ℓ).
• With p∞+ (0) := limℓ↓0 p∞(ℓ) and pn(∞) := limq↑∞ pn(q) we have lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p∞+ (0).
To find the maximal upper bound of convergence, set
δ+ := sup
{
k > 0 | lim
n↑∞
pn(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ), ∀ 0 ≤ ℓ < k
}
∈ [δ,∞].(A.1)
Note that for 0 < ℓ < δ+ we have pn(∞) ≤ pn(ℓrn) so that lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) ≤ p∞(ℓ) ≤ p∞+ (0). As
such, a sufficient condition for bullet point four in Assumption A.1 to hold is that p∞(ℓ) < p∞+ (0) for some
0 < ℓ < δ+.
Under Assumption A.1 we have the following result for positive position sizes:
Proposition A.2. Let Assumption A.1 hold. Let p˜n → p˜.
• If lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p˜ < p∞+ (0) then for n large enough the optimization problem
(A.2) inf
q>0
(qp˜n − qpn(q)) ,
admits a minimizer qˆn > 0.
• If lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p˜ < p∞+ (0) then for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn}:
(A.3) 0 < lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
.
• If additionally limℓ↑δ+ p∞(ℓ) < p˜ < p∞+ (0) then for any sequence {qˆn} of minimizers:
(A.4) lim sup
n↑∞
qˆn
rn
< δ+.
Proof of Proposition A.2. First consider the minimization problem in (A.2). Since p˜n → p˜ there is some
ε > 0 and Nε so that n ≥ Nε implies lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) + ε < p˜n < p∞+ (0) − ε. Next, choose
ℓ > 0 small enough so that p˜n < p∞(ℓ) − ε/2. By enlarging Nε we know for n ≥ Nε that pn(∞) ≤
lim supn↑∞ p
n(∞) + ε/2 and p∞(ℓ) < pn(ℓrn) + ε/4 and hence
(A.5) pn(∞) + ε/2 ≤ p˜n ≤ pn(ℓrn)− ε/4.
For a fixed n, note that limq↑∞(p˜n − pn(q)) = p˜n − pn(∞) ≥ ε/2. Thus, if {qˆmn }m∈N is a minimizing
sequence for (A.2), then {qˆmn } is bounded and hence has an accumulation point qˆn. We now show that
qˆn 6= 0, which combined with the continuity of qpn(q) proves qˆn > 0 is a minimizer. To see that qˆn 6= 0 we
use a contradiction argument. Note that with the γ from Assumption A.1:
lim inf
q↓0
(qp˜n − qpn(q)) = − lim sup
q↓0
qpn(q) ≥ − sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)|.
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For the given ε, by enlarging Nε we may assume that for n ≥ Nε
lim inf
q↓0
(qp˜n − qpn(q)) ≥ − lim sup
n↑∞
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)| − ε = −C(γ)− ε.
But, for the ℓ from (A.5):
(A.6) ℓrnp˜n − ℓrnpn(ℓrn) ≤ −ℓrnε/4.
Combining the last two displays we get that for the chosen n, we have
−ℓrnε/4 ≥ −C(γ)− ε.
However, by potentially enlarging Nε, and since rn →∞, we can always arrange things so that−ℓrnε/4 <
−C(γ)− ε. This leads to a contradiction, proving that qˆn 6= 0.
Now, let {qˆn} be a sequence of minimizers. We first claim that lim infn↑∞ qˆn > 0. Indeed, assume there
is a subsequence (still labeled n) so that limn↑∞ qˆn = 0. We then have, using the γ of Assumption A.1 that
lim inf
n↑∞
(qˆnp˜
n − qˆnpn(qˆn)) = − lim sup
n↑∞
qˆnp
n(qˆn) ≥ − lim sup
n↑∞
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)| = −C(γ).
But, this directly violates the minimality of qˆn in view of (A.6). As such, there is some K > 0 so that
qˆn ≥ K for n large enough.
Now, assume that lim infn↑∞ qˆn/rn = 0 and take a subsequence such that limn↑∞ qˆn/rn = 0. For all
0 < c < δ+ we see
p˜n − pn(crn) ≥ qˆn
crn
(p˜n − pn(qˆn)) .(A.7)
As n ↑ ∞we know that p˜n−pn(crn)→ p˜−p∞(c), qˆn/(crn)→ 0 and p˜n → p˜. Recall that lim infn↑∞ qˆn ≥
K and the γ from Assumption A.1. Note that if K > γ then
pn(K) ≤ pn(γ) = 1
γ
γpn(γ) ≤ 1
γ
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)|,
whereas if K ≤ γ then
pn(K) =
1
K
Kpn(K) ≤ 1
K
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)|.
Putting these together gives
lim sup
n↑∞
pn(qˆn) ≤ 1
γ ∧K lim supn↑∞
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)| = C(γ)
γ ∧K .
Thus, taking n ↑ ∞ in (A.7) gives p˜ ≥ p∞(c). Taking c ↓ 0 gives p˜ ≥ p∞+ (0) a contradiction. Therefore,
(A.3) holds.
Next, assume that lim supn↑∞ qˆn/rn ≥ δ+ and take a subsequence so that limn↑∞ qˆn/rn = k ≥ δ+.
For each c < δ+ we have qˆn/rn ≥ c and hence for any K > 0, qˆn ≥ K for n large enough. Thus, we have
(A.8) Kp˜n −Kpn(K) ≥ qˆn (p˜n − pn(qˆn)) ≥ qˆn (p˜n − pn(crn)) .
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Clearly, Kp˜n/qˆn → 0. Additionally, for any 0 < c′ < δ+:
lim inf
n↑∞
pn(K)
qˆn
≥ lim inf
n↑∞
pn(c′rn)
qˆn
= 0.
Thus, dividing by qˆn in (A.8) and taking n ↑ ∞ yields 0 ≥ p˜ − p∞(c). Taking c ↑ δ+ gives that p˜ ≤
limc↑δ+ p
∞(c), which is a contradiction. Therefore, (A.4) holds.

A.2. Short Positions. We just state the result for q < 0 as the proof is the exact same. First, we assume:
Assumption A.3. {pn} is a family of functions defined on (−∞, 0) such that
• For each n, pn is non-increasing and continuous.
• There exists a γ < 0 such that lim supn↑∞ supq≥γ q|pn(q)| = C(γ) <∞.
• There exists rn →∞ and δ > 0 such that for −δ < ℓ < 0 we have limn↑∞ pn(ℓrn) = p∞(ℓ).
• With p∞− (0) := limℓ↑0 p∞(ℓ) and pn(−∞) := limq↓−∞ pn(q) we have p∞− (0) < lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞).
To find the minimal lower bound of convergence, set
δ− := inf
{
k < 0 | lim
n↑∞
pn(ℓrn) = p
∞(ℓ), ∀0 ≥ ℓ > k
}
≤∈ [−∞, δ−].(A.9)
As before, we have for any δ− < ℓ < 0 that p∞− (0) ≤ p∞(ℓ) ≤ lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞) so that a sufficient
condition for bullet point four above to hold is that p∞− (0) < p∞(ℓ) for some δ− < ℓ < 0. The main result
now reads:
Proposition A.4. Let Assumption A.3 hold. Let p˜n → p˜.
• If p∞− (0) < p˜ < lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞) then for n large enough the optimization problem
(A.10) inf
q<0
(qp˜n − qpn(q)) ,
admits a minimizer qˆn < 0.
• If p∞− (0) < p˜ < lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞) then for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn}:
(A.11) 0 < lim inf
n↑∞
−qˆn
rn
.
• If additionally p∞− (0) < p˜ < limℓ↓δ− p∞(ℓ) then for any sequence {qˆn} of minimizers:
(A.12) lim sup
n↑∞
−qˆn
rn
< −δ−.
A.3. Long and Short Positions. We now combine the long and short results of the previous section into
one result which will be used to prove the frictionless results of Section 4. Here, we assume
Assumption A.5. {pn}n∈N is a sequence of functions on R such that
• For each n, pn is non-increasing and continuous.
• There exists a γ > 0 such that lim supn↑∞ sup|q|≤γ q|pn(q)| = C(γ) <∞.
• There exists rn →∞ and δ > 0 such that for |ℓ| < δ we have pn(ℓrn)→ p∞(ℓ).
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• limℓ→0 p∞(ℓ) = p∞(0).
Proposition A.6. Let Assumption A.5 hold and define δ+, δ− as in (A.1) and (A.9). Let p˜n → p˜.
• Assume that lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p∞(0). If lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p˜ < p∞(0) then for n
large enough any minimizer to the optimization problem infq∈R (qp˜− qpn(q)) is positive. Fur-
thermore, for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn}n∈N we have that 0 < lim infn↑∞ qˆn/rn. If addi-
tionally limℓ↑δ+ p∞(ℓ) < p˜ < p∞(0) then for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn}n∈N we have that
lim supn↑∞ qˆn/rn < δ
+
.
• Assume that p∞(0) < lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞). If p∞(0) < p˜ < lim infn↑∞ pn(−∞) then for n
large enough, any minimizer to the optimization problem infq∈R (qp˜n − qpn(q)) is negative. Fur-
thermore, for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn}n∈N we have that 0 < lim infn↑∞−qˆn/rn. If ad-
ditionally p∞(0) < p˜ < limℓ↓δ− p∞(ℓ) then for any sequence of minimizers {qˆn} we have that
lim supn↑∞−qˆn/rn < −δ−.
Proof of Proposition A.6. We will prove the results for lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) < p˜ < p∞(0) and limℓ↑∞ p∞(ℓ) <
p˜ < p∞(0) respectively; the proof for the other case is the exact same. First, since pn(0) is well defined for
each n, we have 0 × p˜n − 0 × pn(0) = 0. Additionally, for ε > 0 so that lim supn↑∞ pn(∞) + ε < p˜ <
p∞(0) − ε we have for q < 0 and n large enough that
qp˜− qpn(q) ≥ qp˜− qpn(0) ≥ −qε/2 > 0,
But, from (A.6) we see there is some ℓ > 0 so that ℓrnp˜n − ℓrnpn(ℓrn) < 0. Thus it suffices to minimize
over q > 0 and hence Proposition A.2 yields a minimizer to the problem over (0,∞), as well as the
asymptotic behavior qˆn/rn of minimizers qˆn given above, finishing the result.

APPENDIX B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 4.1
The proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 are based on a more general result that we proved in Appendix A.
Hence, as a precursor to the proofs of Theorem 4.3 and 4.4 we first show that the functions pn(q) := pnan(q)
satisfy Assumption A.5 above.
Lemma B.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.3 and 4.1 hold. Then, pn(q) := pnan(q) satisfies Assumption A.5.
Proof of Lemma B.1. As shown in Section 3.1, pnan(q) is decreasing in q and the map q 7→ qpnan(q) is
concave and well defined, finite, for all q ∈ R. As such, pnan(q) is continuous on (−∞, 0) and (0,∞) re-
spectively. But, it is well known that continuity at 0 follows as well and in fact limq→0 pnan(q) = E
Qn0 [B] =
pnan(0) = dn. Thus, bullet point one in Assumption A.5 holds. Regarding bullet point two, let γ > 0. If
0 < q ≤ γ then for any 0 < ℓ < δ+ and n sufficiently large so that rn ≥ ℓ/γ:
pnan(q) ≤ pnan(0) = dn = EQ
n
0 [B] ; pnan(q) ≥ pnan(ℓrn).
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If −γ ≤ q < 0 then for any δ− < ℓ′ < 0 and n so that rn ≥ −ℓ′/γ:
pnan(q) ≥ pnan(0) = dnEQ
n
0 [B] ; pnan(q) ≤ pnan(ℓ′rn).
As such:
lim sup
n↑∞
sup
|q|≤γ
q|pnan(q)| ≤ γmax
{|d|, |p∞(ℓ)|, |p∞(ℓ′)|} = C(γ),
and bullet point two holds. Bullet points three and four are Assumption 3.3, finishing the result. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. For p˜n ∈ In, the optimal position qˆn(p˜n) is the unique solution of the problem (4.3).
Using the explicit formula for Uan in (2.1) and pnan in (2.6), this optimization problem is equivalent to
finding
(B.1) qˆn(p˜n) ∈ argminq∈R
(
qp˜n − qpnan(q)
)
.
The results of the theorem will follow from Proposition A.6 once the requisite hypotheses are met where
pn(q) = pnan(q). By Lemma B.1, Assumption A.5 holds. Now, let p˜n ∈ In, p˜n → p˜ where p˜ and p˜ < d.
Since pn(∞) ≤ p˜n and d = p∞(0) we have
lim sup
n↑∞
pn(∞) = lim sup
n↑∞
Bn ≤ lim
n↑∞
p˜n = p˜ < d = p∞(0).
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6. Similarly let p˜n ∈ In, p˜n → p˜ where p˜
and p˜ > d. Since pn(−∞) ≥ p˜n and d = p∞(0) we have
lim inf
n↑∞
pn(−∞) = lim inf
n↑∞
B¯n ≥ lim
n↑∞
p˜n = p˜ > d = p∞(0).
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6 as well, finishing the result.

Proof of Theorem 4.4. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, it is enough to show that requisite hypotheses of
Proposition A.6 are met where pn(q) = pnan(q) and the optimal position qˆn(p˜
n) is given in (B.1). Again by
Lemma B.1, we have that Assumption A.5 holds. Now, let p˜n ∈ In, p˜n → p˜ where p˜ and p∞(δ+) < p˜ < d.
Since pn(∞) ≤ p˜n and d = p∞(0) we have
lim sup
n↑∞
pn(∞) = lim sup
n↑∞
Bn ≤ lim
n↑∞
p˜n = p˜ < d = p∞(0).
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6. Similarly let p˜n ∈ In, p˜n → p˜ where p˜
and p∞(δ−) > p˜ > d. Since pn(−∞) ≥ p˜n and d = p∞(0) we have
lim inf
n↑∞
pn(−∞) = lim inf
n↑∞
B¯n ≥ lim
n↑∞
p˜n = p˜ > d = p∞(0).
Thus, the conclusions of the theorem follow from Proposition A.6 as well, finishing the result. 
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Let, for example, p˜n → p˜ ∈ (p∞(δ+), d) so that
0 < ℓ = lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜)
rn
≤ lim sup
n↑∞
qˆn(p˜
n)
rn
= ℓ¯ < δ+.
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Write qˆn for qˆn(p˜n) and assume for some subsequence (still labeled n) that qˆn/rn → ℓ ∈ [ℓ, ℓ¯]. Let
τ ∈ [ℓ, ℓ¯]. By the optimality of qˆn
qˆnp˜
n − qˆnpnan(qˆn) ≤ τrnp˜n − τrnpnan(τrn).
Dividing by rn, letting n ↑ ∞ and using Assumption 3.3 with (3.7) one obtains
ℓp˜− ℓp∞(ℓ) ≤ τ p˜− τp∞(τ).
Since this works for all τ ∈ [ℓ, ℓ¯], we get that
ℓp˜− ℓp∞(ℓ) ≤ inf
τ∈[ℓ,ℓ¯]
(τ p˜− τp∞(τ)) .
Hence, we see that the only possible limit points for qˆn/rn are the minimizers of ℓp˜ − ℓp∞(ℓ) over [ℓ, ℓ¯].
But, under the assumption of strict concavity for ℓp∞(ℓ) any minimizer is unique and hence the result
follows. 
Proof of Theorem 4.10. We start be proving the first bullet, i.e., that we show that maximizers exist to the
optimal purchase quantity problem in (4.20). To do so we use the following basic result (see [17, Proposition
2.47]): if U ∈ Ua then with αU , α¯U of (4.16) it holds for Ua from (2.1) with an ≡ a that
U(x) = F (UaU (x)); F (t) = U(U
−1
aU
(t)) = U
(
− 1
aU
log (−aU t)
)
;
Ua¯U (x) = Fˆ (U(x)); Fˆ (t) = Ua¯U (U
−1(t)) = − 1
a¯U
e−a¯UU
−1(t),
and where F, Fˆ are concave and increasing. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality, for any set of random variables
Z:
Fˆ−1
(
sup
Z∈Z
E [Ua¯U (Z)]
)
≤ sup
Z∈Z
E [U(Z)] ≤ F
(
sup
Z∈Z
E
[
UaU (Z)
])
,
where Fˆ−1(s) = U (−(1/a¯U ) log (−a¯Us)) is strictly increasing. Therefore,
U
(
− 1
a¯U
log
(−a¯Uuna¯U (x− qp˜n, q))
)
≤ unU (x− qp˜n, q) ≤ U
(
− 1
aU
log
(
−aUunaU (x− qp˜
n, q)
))
.
Since for any a > 0, una(x− p˜nq, q) = e−a(x−p˜
nq)una(0, q) , we obtain from (2.6) that
U
(
− 1
a¯U
log(−a¯Uuna¯u(0)) + x− p˜nq + qpna¯U (q)
)
≤ unU (x− p˜nq, q)
≤ U
(
− 1
aU
log(−aUunaU (0)) + x− p˜
nq + qpnaU (q)
)
.
(B.2)
Now, let p˜n ∈ In = (Bn, B¯n). As limq↑∞ pnaU (q) = Bn, limq↓−∞ pnaU (q) = B¯n we have
lim
|q|↑∞
q(pnaU (q)− p˜
n) = −∞,
34 MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS, SCOTT ROBERTSON, AND KONSTANTINOS SPILIOPOULOS
and hence from the second inequality in (B.2) and limx↓−∞ U(x) = −∞ (which follows from (4.17)) we
obtain
lim
q↑∞
unU (x− p˜nq, q) = −∞, lim
q↓−∞
unU (x− p˜nq, q) = −∞.
As U(x− p˜nq− |q|‖B‖L∞) ≤ unU (x− p˜nq, q) ≤ 0, any maximizing sequence {qnm}m∈N must be bounded
and has an accumulation point qˆn. Now, unU (x− p˜nq, q) admits the variational representation (see [32])
(B.3) unU (x− p˜nq, q) = inf
Qn∈M˜n,y>0
(
y(x− p˜nq) + yqEQn [B] + E
[
V
(
y
dQn
dP
∣∣∣∣
FT
)])
,
where
(B.4) V (y) := sup
x∈R
(U(x)− xy) .
Thus, we see that q 7→ unU (x− p˜nq, q) is concave, hence continuous on R and qˆn is indeed a maximizer.
We next show for p∞(δ+) < p˜ < d and In ∋ p˜n → p˜ that (4.21) holds (the corresponding proof for
negative positions in (4.22) is omitted as it is the exact same). We first claim that for n large enough, any
maximizer qˆn is positive. Indeed, since dn → d where dn = EQn0 [B] = pna(0) (for any a > 0) and p˜ < d,
p˜n → p˜ we can find n large enough so that p˜n < dn. Thus, for q < 0 we have (since pna(q) is decreasing in
q for any a > 0) that
qpnaU (q)− qp˜
n ≤ q (dn − p˜n) ≤ 0.
In view of (B.2) this implies for q ≤ 0 that
(B.5) unU (x− p˜nq, q) ≤ U
(
− 1
aU
log
(
−aUunaU (0)
)
+ x
)
.
Now, let ℓ > 0 be so that ℓa¯U/a < δ+. At q = ℓrn we have
pna¯U (ℓrn)− p˜n = pna(a¯U ℓ/arn)− p˜n → p∞(a¯U ℓ/a)− p˜.
Since p˜ < p∞(0) and p∞ is continuous at 0 we can find an ℓ small enough so the above quantity is strictly
positive for n large. Thus, from (B.2) we see that
unU (x− p˜nℓrn, ℓrn) ≥ U
(
− 1
a¯U
log(−a¯Uuna¯u(0)) + x− p˜nℓrn + ℓrnpna¯U (ℓrn)
)
.
As n ↑ ∞ the right hand side above converges to 0 whereas the right hand side of (B.5), in view of
Assumption 4.9 is bounded above by U(C + x) < 0 for some constant C . Thus, for large enough n, no
maximizer can be non-positive.
Now, let {qˆn}n∈N be a sequence of (positive) maximizers. We prove the lower bound in (4.21) by
contradiction; i.e. assume lim infn↑∞ qˆn/rn = 0 and take a sequence (still labeled n) where qˆn/rn → 0.
Let 0 < ℓ < δ+a¯U/a and assume qˆn/rn ≤ ℓ. Since qˆn was an optimizer, we obtain from (B.2) that
− 1
a¯U
log(−a¯Uuna¯U (0)) + x− p˜nℓrn + ℓrnpna¯U (ℓrn) ≤ −
1
aU
log(−aUunaU (0)) + x− p˜
nqˆn + qˆnp
n
aU
(qˆn).
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Since ℓrn > 0
− 1
ℓrna¯U
log(−a¯Uuna¯U (0))+
x
ℓrn
−p˜n+pna¯U (ℓrn) ≤ −
1
ℓrnaU
log(−aUunaU (0))+
x
ℓrn
+
qˆn
ℓrn
(
pnaU (qˆn)− p˜
n
)
.
For any a > 0, −(1/a) ≤ una(0) = −(1/a)e−H(Q
n
0 | P)
. Additionally, from (2.7) it holds for any a, b > 0
that pna(q) = pnb (aq/b). Thus by Assumptions 3.3 and 4.9
p∞
(
a¯Uℓ
a
)
− p˜ ≤ lim inf
n↑∞
qˆn
ℓrn
(
pnau(qˆn)− p˜
n
)
= 0,
where the last equality follows since qˆn/rn → 0, p˜n → p˜ and |pnaU (q)| ≤ ‖B‖L∞ . Taking ℓ ↓ 0 gives
p˜ ≥ p∞(0) a contradiction. Therefore, lim infn↑∞ qˆn/rn > 0.
To obtain the upper bound in (4.21), we first claim that
(B.6) pnU(x, qˆn) ≥ p˜n.
Assuming (B.6) the upper bound in (4.21) readily follows: indeed, assume lim supn↑∞ qˆn/rn = k ≥ δ+
and take a subsequence (still labeled n) so that qˆn/rn → k. Let 0 < ℓ < δ+ so that qˆn/rn ≥ ℓ for n large
enough. Since pnU(x, q) is decreasing in q, (B.6) implies p˜n ≤ pnU (x, ℓrn). Taking n ↑ ∞ gives p˜ ≤ p∞(ℓ)
and then taking ℓ ↑ δ+ gives p˜ ≤ p∞(δ+). But, this is a contradiction and hence (4.21) holds.
To prove (B.6), come back to (B.3). Write ZQ,n := dQn0/dP|FT . From (B.3) it follows for any y > 0
that
(B.7) u
n
U (x− p˜nq, q)− unU (x)
y
+ p˜nq ≤ qEQn0 [B] + 1
y
(
E
[
V (yZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
.
Consider the problem
(B.8) inf
y>0
1
y
(
E
[
V (yZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
.
According to [33, Lemma A.4] the map y 7→ E [V (yZQ,n)] is differentiable with derivative E [ZQ,nV ′(yZQ,n)].
Thus, we see the derivative of the above map is
1
y2
(
E
[
yZQ,nV ′(yZQ,n)− V (yZQ,n)
]
+ unU (x)
)
=
1
y2
(
E
[∫ yZQ,n
0
τV ′′(τ)dτ
]
+ unU (x)
)
,
where the last equality follows since (d/dτ)(τV ′(τ) − V (τ)) = τV ′′(τ) and since U ∈ Ua implies
limτ↓0 τV
′(τ) = limτ↓0 V (τ) = 0. Since U ∈ Ua and Assumption 4.9 imply unU (x) < 0, the strict
convexity of V yields a unique yQ,n solving (B.8) and this y satisfies the first order condition
−unU (x) = E
[∫ yQ,nZQ,n
0
τV ′′(τ)dτ
]
.
A straightforward calculation shows τV ′′(τ) = 1/αU (I(τ)) where I(τ) = (U ′)−1 (τ). Since U ∈ Ua
implies 0 < aU < αU (x) < a¯U on R we see that E
[
ZQ,n
]
= 1 gives
1
a¯U
yQ,n ≤ −unU (x) ≤
1
aU
yQ,n,
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or equivalently, that −aUunU (x) ≤ yQ,n ≤ −a¯UunU (x). Using this yQ,n in (B.7) gives
unU (x− p˜nq, q)− unU (x)
yQ,n
+ p˜nq ≤ qEQn [B] + 1
yQ,n
(
E
[
V (yQ,nZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
= qEQ
n
[B] + inf
y>0
1
y
(
E
[
V (yZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
.
We have already shown the existence of a qˆn > 0 which maximizes unU (x − p˜nq, q) and shown that for n
large enough un(x− p˜qˆn, qˆn) > unU (x). Thus, for this qˆn we have, using the inequalities for yQ,n that
− 1
a¯UunU (x)
(unU (x− p˜nqˆn, qˆn)− unU (x)) + p˜nqˆn ≤ qˆnEQ
n
[B] + inf
y>0
1
y
(
E
[
V (yZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
,
or, since this inequality is valid for any Qn ∈ M˜n that
unU (x− p˜nqˆn, qˆn)− unU (x)− a¯UunU (x)p˜nqˆn
≤ −a¯uunU (x)
(
inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
qˆnE
Qn [B] + inf
y>0
1
y
(
E
[
V (yZQ,n)
]
+ xy − unU (x)
)))
= −a¯UunU (x)qˆnpnU (x, qˆn),
where the last equality follows from [32, Proposition 7.1]. We thus obtain the bounds
(B.9) unU (x) ≤ unU (x− p˜nqˆn, qˆn) ≤ unU (x)− a¯UunU (x)qˆn (pnU (x, qˆn)− p˜n) .
which, since unU (x) < 0, qˆn > 0 implies (B.6), finishing the result. 
APPENDIX C. PROOFS FROM SECTION 7
We begin with a lemma¶ showing how the indifference price scales with the initial position and risk
aversion. This is an easy consequence of the fact that At is a cone: i.e. for each c > 0, (L,M) ∈ At ⇔
(cL, cM) ∈ At. Throughout, we assume that x, y ∈ R, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , s > 0, a > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1) (resp.
λn ∈ (0, 1)).
Lemma C.1. For pa as in (7.5) and q > 0:
(C.1) pa(qx, qy, q; s, t, λ) = pqa(x, y, 1; s, t, λ).
Proof of Lemma C.1. For (L,M) ∈ At and X,Y as in (7.2) note that
− a
(
XL,M,qx,tT + Y
L,M,qy,t
T − q(ST −K)+
)
= −qa
(
X
L/q,M/q,x,t
T + Y
L/q,M/q,x,t
T − (ST −K)+
)
.
(C.2)
As At is a cone:
inf
(L,M)∈At
Es,t
[
e−a(X
L,M,qx,t
T +Y
L,M,qy,t
T −q(ST−K)
+)
]
= inf
(L,M)∈At
Es,t
[
e−qa(X
L,M,x,t
T +Y
L,M,y,t
T −(ST−K)
+)
]
.
By removing (ST −K)+ from the above calculations we obtain from (7.3) and (7.4):
(C.3) ua(qx, qy, q; s, t, λ) = quqa(x, y, 1; s, t, λ); ua(qx, qy; s, t, λ) = quqa(x, y; s, t, λ).
¶See the comment in [4, Section 2.1].
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It is clear for x′ ∈ R that uqa(x+x′, y, 1; s, t, λ) = e−qax′uqa(x, y, 1; s, t, λ). To make the notation cleaner
set p = pa(qx, qy, q; s, t, λ) and p′ = pqa(x, y, 1; s, t, λ) so that (C.1) becomes p = p′. Using the above
facts
uqa(x, y; s, t, λ) =
1
q
ua(qx, qy; s, t, λ) =
1
q
ua(qx+ qp, qy, q; s, t, λ);
=
1
q
ua(qx+ qp
′ + q(p− p′), qy, q; s, t, λ);
= uqa(x+ p
′ + (p− p′), y, 1; s, t, λ);
= e−qa(p−p
′)uqa(x+ p
′, y, 1; s, t, λ);
= e−qa(p−p
′)uqa(x, y; s, t, λ).
Thus, p = p′. 
As in [4, pp. 374-375], for ε > 0 define
vε(x, y, s, t;λ) := 1 +
1
ε
u1/ε(x, y, 1; s, t, λ); v
ε,f (x, y, s, t;λ) := 1 +
1
ε
u1/ε(x, y; s, t, λ).(C.4)
Next, define
zε(x, y, s, t;λ) := x+ sy + ε log (1− vε(x, y, s, t;λ)) ;
= x+ sy + ε log
(
−1
ε
u1/ε(x, y, 1; s, t, λ)
)
,
zε,f (x, y, s, t;λ) := x+ sy + ε log
(
1− vε,f(x, y, s, t;λ)
)
;
= x+ sy + ε log
(
−1
ε
u1/ε(x, y; s, t, λ)
)
.
(C.5)
Note that by definition x + py − zε and x + py − zε,f are the respective certainty equivalents in the λ
transactions costs market with and without the claim. Furthermore:
Lemma C.2. zε, zε,f from (C.5) are independent of x and hence write zε(y, s, t;λ), zε,f (y, s, t;λ). Fur-
thermore:
Ψ(s, t; 0) − εµ
2
2σ2
(T − t) ≤ zε(y, s, t;λ) ≤ s(1 + λ|y − 1|);
−εµ
2
2σ2
(T − t) ≤ zε,f (y, s, t;λ) ≤ λs|y|,
(C.6)
where µ is the drift of S as in (7.1) and Ψ(s, t; 0) is the Black-Scholes price in the frictionless model. Next,
for a fixed (y, s, t) and ε, both zε, zε,f are increasing in λ. Lastly, for a fixed (y, s, t) and λ, both zε and
zε,f are continuous and decreasing in ε on (0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma C.2. That zε, zε,f are independent of x and that (C.6) holds both follow from [4, Proposi-
tion 2.1]. Next, using the definition of vε in (C.4) and (7.2) we have
zε(y, s, t;λ) − sy
= inf
(L,M)∈At
ε log
(
Es,t
[
e−
1
ε (−
∫ T
t
Sτ (1+λ)dLτ+
∫ T
t
Sτ (1+λ)dMτ+yST+ST (LT−MT )−(ST−K)
+)
])
= inf
(L,M)∈At
ε log
(
Es,t
[
e−
1
ε (−
∫ T
t
SτdLτ+
∫ T
t
SτdMτ+yST+ST (LT−MT )−(ST−K)
+)e
λ
ε
∫ T
t
Sτ (dLτ+dMτ )
])
.
It is thus evident that zε(y, s, t;λ) is increasing in λ. Since the same formula holds for zε,f , just absent
the (ST − K)+ term, zε,f (y, s, t;λ) is also increasing in λ. Also, that zε(y, s, t;λ), zε,f (y, s, t;λ) are
decreasing in ε follows from Holder’s inequality. Lastly, note that the map
γ 7→ inf
(L,M)∈At
Es,t
[
e−γ(−
∫ T
t
Sτ (1+λ)dLτ+
∫ T
t
Sτ (1+λ)dMτ+yST+ST (LT−MT )−(ST−K)
+)
]
,
is convex on (0,∞) (and again, also when the (ST −K)+ term is absent). Indeed, take 0 < γ1 < γ2 and
0 < λ < 1. Set γλ = λγ1 + (1− λ)γ2 and let (L1,M2), (L2,M2) ∈ At. Since z 7→ e−z is convex and
(L,M) =
λγ1
γλ
(L1,M1) +
(1− λ)γ2
γλ
(L2,M2) ∈ At
the convexity follows by first minimizing over (L1,M1) then over (L2,M2). Since convex functions
are continuous on the interior of their effective domain and since zε, zε,f are finite by (C.6) we see that
zε(y, s, t;λ), zε,f (y, s, t;λ) are continuous in ε on (0,∞).

Proof of Proposition 7.2. Using Lemma C.1 at q = (εa)−1 gives
pa
(
x
εa
,
y
εa
,
1
εa
; s, t;λ
)
= p1/ε (x, y, 1; s, t, λ) ,
so that
vε
(
x+ pa
(
x
εa
,
y
εa
,
1
εa
; s, t;λ
)
, y, p, t;µ
)
= vε,f (x, y, s, t;λ).
Thus, using (C.4), (C.5) one obtains, since Lemma C.2 shows zε, zε,f are independent of the capital x, that
pa
(
x
εa
,
y
εa
,
1
εa
; s, t, λ
)
= zε
(
x+ pa
(
x
εγ
,
y
εγ
,
1
εa
; s, t;λ
)
, y, s, t;λ
)
− zε,f (x, y, s, t;λ)
= zε (y, s, t;λ)− zε,f (y, s, t;λ).
Thus, pa is independent of x. The conclusions of the theorem now readily follow: namely let rn = λ−2n and
set qn = ℓrn. Let yn ∈ R. Take εn = λ2n/(aℓ) = (qna)−1 so that qn = (εna)−1 and λn =
√
εn
√
aℓ. We
then have
pa(yn, qn; s, t;λn) = pa
(
ynλ
2
n/ℓ
εna
,
1
εna
; s, t,
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
= zεn
(
ynλ
2
n
ℓ
, s, t;
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
− zεn,f
(
ynλ
2
n
ℓ
, s, t;
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
.
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Now, by [4, Theorem 3.1] we have for any y0 ∈ R that
(C.7) lim
n↑∞
zεn
(
y0, s, t;
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
= Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ); lim
n↑∞
zεn,f
(
y0, s, t;
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
= 0.
Furthermore, as shown on [4, pp. 389]∣∣∣∣zεn
(
ynλ
2
n
ℓ
, s, t;
√
εn
√
aℓ
)
− zεn(0, s, t;√εn
√
aℓ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λnsλ2n|yn|ℓ ,
with the same inequality also holding for zεn,f . Thus, if limn↑∞ λ3n|yn| = 0 we see that
lim
n↑∞
pa(yn, qn; s, t;λn) = Ψ(p, t;
√
aℓ),
which is the desired result.

Proof of Theorem 7.4 . The proof of convergence follows the weak viscosity limits of [3], see also Chapter
VII of [16]. Let us define
Ψ∗(s, t) = lim sup
ρ↓0
lim sup
b↓0
sup
{
Ψ(sˆ, tˆ; b) : |s− sˆ|+ |t− tˆ| < ρ} ,
and
Ψ∗(s, t) = lim inf
ρ↓0
lim inf
b↓0
inf
{
Ψ(sˆ, tˆ; b) : |s− sˆ|+ |t− tˆ| < ρ} .
Step 1: Ψ∗(s, t) is a viscosity subsolution to the linear Black-Scholes equation.
Let w(s, t) be a smooth test function and assume that (s0, t0) ∈ (0,∞)× [0, T ] is a strict local maximizer
of the difference Ψ∗(s, t)− w(s, t) on [0,∞) × [0, T ] such that Ψ∗(s0, t0) = w(s0, t0). We may, and will
do so, assume that wss(s0, t0) 6= 0. We verify that Ψ∗ is a viscosity subsolution, by proving that if t0 < T ,
then
−wt(s0, t0)− 1
2
s20σ
2wss(s0, t0) ≤ 0,
whereas if t0 = T , then either the previous inequality holds or Ψ∗(s0, T ) ≤ (s0 −K)+.
Let us assume that either t0 < T or that t0 = T and Ψ∗(s0, T ) > (s0 − K)+. Consider a sequence
bn ↓ 0 and local maximizers (sn, tn) ∈ (0,∞) × [0, T ) of the function
(s, t) 7→ Ψ(s, t; bn)− w(s, t),
such that
(sn, tn)→ (s0, t0),Ψ(sn, tn; bn)→ Ψ∗(s0, t0), and Ψ(sn, tn; bn)− w(sn, tn)→ 0.
The existence of such a sequence and maximizers is shown in [3]. Notice that for n large enough we
have tn < T . Indeed, if t0 < T , then tn < T for large enough n follows by the convergence tn → t0. Let’s
now assume that t0 = T and Ψ∗(s0, T ) > (s0 −K)+ and let tn = T . We calculate
Ψ∗(s0, t0) = lim
n→∞
Ψ(sn, T ; bn) = (s0 −K)+.
But, since we have assumed that Ψ∗(s0, T ) > (s0−K)+ we get a contradiction, which implies that tn < T
for all n large enough.
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Let us set now kn = Ψ(sn, tn; bn)− w(sn, tn) and define the operator
Gb[Ψ] = 1
2
σ2s2Ψss(s, t)
(
1 + S
(
bs2Ψss(s, t)
))
.
By the fact that Ψ(; bn) is a continuous viscosity solution of (7.6) and that the function A 7→ A(1+S(A))
is increasing function, we get the following
0 ≥ −wt(sn, tn)− Gbn [w(sn, tn) + kn].
Taking now n→∞ and using the facts that ℓn → 0, (sn, tn)→ (s0, t0), kn → 0 and S(0) = 0, we get
−wt(s0, t0)− 1
2
σ2s20wss(s0, t0) ≤ 0,
completing the proof of the viscosity subsolution property of Ψ∗.
Step 2: Ψ∗(s, t) is a viscosity supersolution to the linear Black-Scholes equation.
The proof if this step is almost identical to the proof of the previous step. Let w(s, t) be a smooth
test function and assume that (s0, t0) ∈ (0,∞) × [0, T ] is a strict global minimizer of the difference
Ψ∗(s, t)−w(s, t) on [0,∞)× [0, T ] such that Ψ∗(s0, t0) = w(s0, t0). We may, and will do so, assume that
wss(s0, t0) 6= 0. We verify that Ψ∗ is a viscosity supersolution, by proving that if t0 < T , then
−wt(s0, t0)− 1
2
s2σ2wss(s0, t0) ≥ 0.
If t0 = T , then by construction we have the supersolution property Ψ∗(s, T ) ≥ (s −K)+. We need to
show the viscosity property.
Consider a sequence bn ↓ 0 and local minimizers (sn, tn) ∈ (0,∞) × [0, T ) of the function
(s, t) 7→ Ψ(s, t; bn)− w(s, t),
such that
(sn, tn)→ (s0, t0),Ψ(sn, tn; bn)→ Ψ∗(s0, t0), and Ψ(sn, tn; bn)− w(sn, tn)→ 0.
The existence of such a sequence and minimizers is shown in [3]. Notice that, as in the viscosity subsolution
case, for n large enough, we have that tn < T .
By the fact that Ψ(; bn) is a viscosity solution of (7.6) and that the function A 7→ A(1 + S(A)) is
increasing function, we get the following
0 ≤ −wt(sn, tn)− Gbn [w(sn, tn) + kn].
Taking now n→∞ and using the facts that ℓn → 0, (sn, tn)→ (s0, t0), kn → 0 and S(0) = 0, we get
−wt(s0, t0)− 1
2
σ2s20wss(s0, t0) ≥ 0,
completing the proof of the viscosity supersolution property of Ψ∗.
Step 3: Putting the estimates together
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By construction we have that Ψ∗ ≤ Ψ∗. Then a comparison argument as in proof of Theorem 3.1 of [4],
or equivalently see Section VII.8 of [16], gives the opposite inequality, i.e., Ψ∗ ≥ Ψ∗. Thus we have that
Ψ∗ = Ψ
∗ and the function Ψ0 = Ψ∗ = Ψ∗ is solution to the equation
Ψt +
1
2
σ2s2Ψss = 0; Ψ(T, s) = (s−K)+.
Classical arguments, e.g. Theorem 7.1 of [16], then imply that the equality Ψ∗ = Ψ∗ implies the local
uniform convergence Ψℓ → Ψ0 as ℓ→ 0. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 7.5. From Lemma C.2 at λ = b√ε it follows that zε(y, s, t; b√ε) is increasing in b. Since
[4, Theorem 3.1] implies limε→0 zε(y, s, t; b
√
ε) = Ψ(s, t; b), it follows that Ψ(s, t; b) is increasing in b.
As for the asymptotics in (7.7) by construction Ψ(s, T ; b) = (s − K)+ for p > 0, b > 0. Thus, we only
consider when t < T . Here, we recall from Proposition 7.2 that limA↑∞ S(A)/A = 1. Furthermore, as
shown in [4], S(A) > 0 for A > 0. Thus, let γ > 0 and pick Aγ so that S(A) ≥ (1− γ)A for A ≥ Aγ .
Now, let ψ : (0,∞) × [0, T ] be a smooth function with ψss ≥ 0. Write
H[ψ] := ψt +
1
2
σ2s2ψss
(
1 + S(b2s2ψss)
)
.
We have the following basic estimate, since ψss ≥ 0 and A 7→ A(1 + S(A)) is increasing:
H[ψ] ≥ ψt + 1s2ψss≥Aγ
b2
(
1
2
σ2s2ψss
(
1 + (1− γ)b2s2ψss
))
= ψt + 1s2ψss≥
Aγ
b2
(
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1 − γ)b
)2
− σ
2
8b2(1− γ)
)
≥ ψt − σ
2
8b2(1− γ) +
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1 − γ)b
)2
− 1
s2ψss<
Aγ
b2
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1− γ)b
)2
≥ ψt − σ
2
8b2(1− γ) +
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1 − γ)b
)2
− 1− γ
2
σ2
(
Aγ
b
+
1
2(1− γ)b
)2
= ψt − σ
2Kγ
2b2
+
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1 − γ)b
)2
where
Kγ :=
1
4(1− γ) + (1− γ)
(
Aγ +
1
2(1− γ)
)
.
To recap, we have for ψ smooth with ψss ≥ 0 that
(C.8) H[ψ] ≥ ψt − σ
2Kγ
2b2
+
1− γ
2
σ2
(
bs2ψss +
1
2(1− γ)b
)2
.
Now, let C > 0 and denote by φ(s, t;C) the Black-Scholes price at (s, t) for a call option with strike K ,
maturity T when the interest rate is 0 and the asset volatility is C . Let M ∈ R and consider the function
ψ(s, t) = φ(s, t;C)−M(T − t).
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Clearly, ψ is smooth and from the explicit formula for φ(s, t;C) it follows that ψss ≥ 0. We then have from
(C.8) (writing φC to denote the dependence upon C) that
H[ψ] ≥ φCt +M −
σ2Kγ
2a2
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ2
(
bs2φCss +
1
2(1− γ)b
)2
;
= −1
2
C2s2φCss +M −
σ2Kγ
2b2
+
1
2
(1− γ)σ2
(
bs2φCss +
1
2(1− γ)b
)2
.
The quadratic form (1/2)(1 − γ)σ2b2x2 + (1/2)(σ2 − C2)x is bounded below by
−1
8
(σ2 − C2)2
(1− γ)σ2b2 .
Plugging this into the above (with s2φCss playing the role of x) yields
H[ψ] ≥ − (σ
2 − C2)2
8(1− γ)σ2b2 +M −
σ2Kγ
2b2
+
σ2
8(1 − γ)b2 .
Clearly, setting
M =
(σ2 − C2)2
8(1− γ)σ2b2 +
σ2Kγ
2b2
− σ
2
8(1− γ)b2 =
C4
8(1 − γ)σ2b2 −
C2
4(1 − γ)b2 +
σ2Kγ
2b2
,(C.9)
yields that H[ψ] ≥ 0 and hence by the comparison argument shown in [4, Theorem 3.1, pp. 395-396] it
follows that Ψ(s, t; b) ≥ ψ(s, t). To connect with the results therein, set
z∗(s, t) = ψ(s, t) = φ(s, t;C)−M(T − t); z∗(s, t) = Ψ(s, t; b),
and note that z∗ is a (classical) sub-solution; z∗ is a continuous viscosity super-solution; lims↑∞ z∗(s, t)/s =
1, lims↑∞ z∗(s, t)/s = 1 uniformly in 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; and that z∗(0, t) = −M(a)(T − t) ≤ z∗(0, t) = 0 for
any t ≤ T if C > √2σ. Thus, the argument in [4, pp. 395-396] goes through.
Now, so far the choice of C > 0 was arbitrary. Consider then when C = b1/4. Here we have as b →∞
that
C = C(b)→∞,
M = M(b) =
1
8(1− γ)σ2b −
1
4(1 − γ)b3/2 +
σ2Kγ
2b2
→ 0.
Thus, we have from the comparison principle that
lim inf
b↑∞
Ψ(s, t; b) ≥ lim inf
b↑∞
φ(s, t;C(b))−M(b)(T − t) = s,
where the last equality follows from the well known fact that the price of a call in the Black-Scholes model
converges to the initial stock price as the volatility approaches infinity. This completes the proof since it
was shown in [4, Proposition 2.1, Theorem 3.1] that Ψ(s, t; b) ≤ s for all b > 0. 
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Proof of Theorem 7.7. We verify that Proposition A.2 holds, yielding the desired result. As a first step
towards this direction, we rewrite the involved optimization problem in a form that is easier to work with.
For p˜n ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) recall the optimal sale quantity problem in (7.8):
max
q>0
ua(x+ ys(1− λn) + qp˜n, 0, q; s, t;λn).
With x˜ = x+ ys(1− λn) we have, in view of (C.3) and (C.4), (C.5), that for q > 0:
ua(x˜+ qp˜
n, 0, q; s, t;λn) =
1
a
(
v
1
qa
(
x˜
q
+ p˜n, 0, s, t;λn
)
− 1
)
= −1
a
e
−a
(
x˜+qp˜n−qz
1
qa (0,s,t;λn)
)
,
(C.10)
and hence it suffices to consider the optimization problem
(C.11) sup
q>0
(
qp˜n − qz 1qa (0, s, t;λn)
)
= − inf
q>0
(
q(−p˜n)− q
(
−z 1qa (0, s, t;λn)
))
.
The existence of a maximizer qˆn > 0, as well as the asymptotic behavior of qˆn/rn in (7.9) as λn → 0 will
follow from Proposition A.2 once the requisite hypotheses are shown to hold. Here, pn is the map
q 7→ pn(q) = −z 1qa (0, s, t;λn).
We first consider Assumption A.1. As for bullet point one, note that by Lemma C.2, pn is continuous and
non-increasing on (0,∞). Regarding bullet point two, (C.6) gives
−qs(1 + λn) ≤ qpn(q) ≤ −qΨ(s, t; 0) + µ
2
2aσ2
(T − t),
so that for any γ > 0
lim sup
n↑∞
sup
q≤γ
q|pn(q)| ≤ γmax
{
Ψ(s, t; 0) +
µ2
2aσ2
(T − t), γs
}
:= C(γ) <∞,
verifying bullet point two. Regarding bullet point three, from (C.7) where εn = λ2n/(aℓ), qn = ℓrn and
rn = λ
−2
n it holds for all ℓ > 0 that pn(ℓrn)→ −Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ) = p∞(ℓ). Thus, bullet point three holds with
δ = δ+ = ∞. Lastly, regarding bullet point four, since Theorem 7.5 shows that limℓ↑∞Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ) =
− limℓ↑∞ p∞(ℓ) = −s and s > Ψ(s, t; 0) = −p∞+ (0), bullet point four holds (see the sufficient condition
Assumption A.1). Therefore, Assumption A.1 holds. Lastly, as stated above for p˜ ∈ (Ψ(s, t; 0), s) we have
−s = lim
ℓ↑∞
p∞(ℓ) < −p˜ < p∞+ (0) = lim
ℓ↓0
(−Ψ(s, t;
√
aℓ)) = −Ψ(s, t; 0).
Therefore, the results of Proposition A.2 go through, finishing the proof.

44 MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS, SCOTT ROBERTSON, AND KONSTANTINOS SPILIOPOULOS
REFERENCES
[1] M. ANTHROPELOS AND G. ŽITKOVI ´C, On agent’s agreement and partial-equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets, Math.
Finance, 20 (2010), pp. 411–446.
[2] G. A. ATKESON, L. A. EISFELDT, AND P.-O. WEILL, The market of otc derivatives. National Bureau of Economics Re-
seach, 2013.
[3] G. BARLES AND B. PERTHAME, Exit time problems in control and vanishing viscocity solutions of hamilton-jacobi-bellman
equations, SIAM Journal of Control and Opitmization, 26 (1988), pp. 1113–1148.
[4] G. BARLES AND H. M. SONER, Option pricing with transaction costs and a nonlinear Black-Scholes equation, Finance
Stoch., 2 (1998), pp. 369–397.
[5] P. BARRIEU AND N. EL KAROUI, Inf-convolution of risk measures and optimal risk transfer, Finance Stoch., 9 (2005),
pp. 269–298.
[6] M. BICHUCH, Asymptotic analysis for optimal investment in finite time with transaction costs, SIAM J. Financial Math., 3
(2012), pp. 433–458.
[7] BIS, Amounts outstanding of over-the-counter derivatives by risk category and instrument, Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), (2014). http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm.
[8] B. BOUCHARD, R. ELIE, AND L. MOREAU, A note on utility based pricing and asymptotic risk diversification, Mathematics
and Financial Economics, 6 (2012), pp. 59–74.
[9] R. CARMONA, Indifference pricing, Princeton Series in Financial Engineering, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
2009. Theory and applications.
[10] G. M. CONSTANTINIDES, Capital market equilibrium with transaction costs, The Journal of Political Economy, (1986),
pp. 842–862.
[11] C. CZICHOWSKY AND W. SCHACHERMAYER, Duality Theory for Portfolio Optimisation under Transaction Costs, working
paper, (2014).
[12] M. DAVIS, Option Pricing in Incomplete Markets, Mathematics of Derivative Securities, (1997).
[13] M. H. A. DAVIS, V. G. PANAS, AND T. ZARIPHOPOULOU, European option pricing with transaction costs, SIAM J. Control
Optim., 31 (1993), pp. 470–493.
[14] F. DELBAEN, P. GRANDITS, T. RHEINLÄNDER, D. SAMPERI, M. SCHWEIZER, AND C. STRICKER, Exponential hedging
and entropic penalties, Math. Finance, 12 (2002), pp. 99–123.
[15] A. DEMBO AND O. ZEITOUNI, Large deviations techniques and applications, vol. 38 of Applications of Mathematics (New
York), Springer-Verlag, New York, second ed., 1998.
[16] W. FLEMING AND M. SONER, Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions, vol. 25 of Stochastic modelling and
applied probability, Springer, New York, second ed., 2006.
[17] H. FÖLLMER AND A. SCHIED, Stochastic finance, vol. 27 of de Gruyter Studies in Mathematics, Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
Berlin, extended ed., 2004. An introduction in discrete time.
[18] M. FRITTELLI, The minimal entropy martingale measure and the valuation problem in incomplete markets, Math. Finance,
10 (2000), pp. 39–52.
[19] P. GRANDITS AND T. RHEINLÄNDER, On the minimal entropy martingale measure, Ann. Probab., 30 (2002), pp. 1003–1038.
[20] P. GUASONI AND J. MUHLE-KARBE, Portfolio choice with transaction costs: a user’s guide, in Paris-Princeton Lectures on
Mathematical Finance 2013, vol. 2081 of Lecture Notes in Math., Springer, Cham, 2013, pp. 169–201.
[21] V. HENDERSON, Valuation of claims on nontraded assets using utility maximization, Math. Finance, 12 (2002), pp. 351–373.
[22] S. D. HODGES AND A. NEUBERGER, Optimal replication of contingent claims under transactions costs, Review of Futures
Markets, 8 (1989), pp. 222–239.
[23] R. HYND, Option pricing in the large risk aversion, small transaction cost limit, Comm. Partial Differential Equations, 39
(2014), pp. 1998–2027.
THE PRICING OF CONTINGENT CLAIMS AND OPTIMAL POSITIONS IN ASYMPTOTICALLY COMPLETE MARKETS 45
[24] A. ˙ILHAN, M. JONSSON, AND R. SIRCAR, Optimal investment with derivative securities, Finance Stoch., 9 (2005), pp. 585–
595.
[25] T. ISHIKAWA AND S. ROBERTSON, Contingent claim pricing in markets with defaultable assets, Working Paper, (2015).
[26] Y. M. KABANOV AND C. STRICKER, On the optimal portfolio for the exponential utility maximization: remarks to the
six-author paper “Exponential hedging and entropic penalties” [Math. Finance 12 (2002), no. 2, 99–123; MR1891730
(2003b:91046)] by F. Delbaen, P. Grandits, T. Rheinländer, D. Samperi, M. Schweizer and C. Stricker, Math. Finance, 12
(2002), pp. 125–134.
[27] J. KALLSEN AND J. MUHLE-KARBE, On using shadow prices in portfolio optimization with transaction costs, Ann. Appl.
Probab., 20 (2010), pp. 1341–1358.
[28] J. KALLSEN AND J. MUHLE-KARBE, Option pricing and hedging with small transaction costs, Mathematical Finance,
(2013).
[29] Y. LEE AND T. RHEINLÄNDER, Optimal martingale measures for defaultable assets, Stochastic Process. Appl., 122 (2012),
pp. 2870–2884.
[30] M. MANIA AND M. SCHWEIZER, Dynamic exponential utility indifference valuation, Ann. Appl. Probab., 15 (2005),
pp. 2113–2143.
[31] M. MUSIELA AND T. ZARIPHOPOULOU, An example of indifference prices under exponential preferences, Finance Stoch.,
8 (2004), pp. 229–239.
[32] M. P. OWEN AND G. ŽITKOVI ´C, Optimal investment with an unbounded random endowment and utility-based pricing, Math.
Finance, 19 (2009), pp. 129–159.
[33] S. ROBERTSON, Pricing for large positions in contingent claims, Mathematical Finance, (Forthcoming).
[34] S. ROBERTSON AND K. SPILIOPOULOS, Indifference pricing for contingent claims: Large deviations effects, Mathematical
Finance, (Forthcoming).
[35] S. E. SHREVE AND H. M. SONER, Optimal investment and consumption with transaction costs, Ann. Appl. Probab., 4
(1994), pp. 609–692.
[36] P. SIORPAES, Optimal investment and price dependence in a semi-static market, Finance Stoch., 19 (2015), pp. 161–187.
[37] S. STOIKOV AND T. ZARIPHOPOULOU, Optimal investments in the presence of unhedgeable risks and under cara prefer-
ences, IMA Volume Series, (2005).
[38] M. TEHRANCHI, Explicit solutions of some utility maximization problems in incomplete markets, Stochastic Process. Appl.,
114 (2004), pp. 109–125.
[39] A. V. D. VAART, Asymptotic statistics, vol. 22 of Statistical and Probabilistic Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, New
York, first ed., 1998.
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS, PIRAEUS, GREECE
E-mail address: anthropel@unipi.gr
QUESTROM SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA 02215
E-mail address: scottrob@bu.edu
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS & STATISTICS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA 02215
E-mail address: kspiliop@math.bu.edu
